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In the early 1790s, problems with Great Britain 
dominated American foreign policy. The United States had 
several difficulties with respect to Great Britain, The most 
important of which were conflicts having to do with British 
retention of the northwest posts and territory ceded to the 
United States by the Treaty of Paris (1783), and the trade 
policies of the British Empire both before and during the 
Wars of the French Revolution. These problems became so 
great in 1794 that they. n> ->st led to war, and it was this 
war scare which prompted President Washington to send John 
Jay to London for talks with Lord Grenville, the British 
Foreign Secretary.
Both nations were highly motivated to avoid war.
Britain was at war with the French Republic, and could not 
afford a war in two hemispheres. The United States could not 
risk losing its best trading partne.' at such a crucial time; 
it desperately needed revenue to gain a measure of fiscal 
security after the chaos of the Articles of Confederation. 
Both nations needed a stabilisation of relations, and this 
came with the Jay Treaty.
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Although both issues contributed equally to the M r
■^♦eir#-.of the; crisis crested by British retention o f t b b
posts was the least partisan. Both Federalists and 
Republicans agreed that the British had no right to retain 
the posts. To be sure, the two factions disagreed on the 
methods of dealing with the problem, but the retention of the 
posts was a source of embarrassment for the entire nation.
According to the Article VII of the Treaty of Paris 
(1783), the British were to evacuate posts and garrisons in 
American territory "with all convenient speed,” However, by 
1793, the British had not yet given them up and there were no 
plans to do so. The official British reason for retention 
was that the United States had not yet complied with the 
treaty, in that debts to British creditors had not been paid 
and loyalists were still being harassed by the individual 
states.*
These were legitimate British complaints during the 
Confederation era. At that time, the central government did 
not have the power to force the states to ay debts owed to 
British citizens, as treaties were not considered Law of the 
land. Also, because the states were not required to send 
revenue to the central government, it did not have the money 
to pay the debts itself. The loyalist issue was similar in
i f S t i i ^ ^ l i i i  not  fore# tfc« dt * ta $ ' 
to compensate loyalists for seised property, nor could it 
stop them from harassing loyalists in other ways, such as 
illegal prosecution. The actions of the states were in 
direct violation of the fifth and sixth articles of the peace 
treaty
An example of American infractions was a complaint sent 
to Lord Grenville by nineteen loyalists, claiming that the 
American states passed laws restricting their right to full 
compensation. The loyalists reported that the courts had 
classified them as American citizens, instead of British 
subjects, because the treaty did not apply to American 
citizens. The complainants stated in the letter that they 
had never accepted American citizenship, and therefore could 
not be classified as if they had,'
The debt issue could have been solved quickly after the 
Constitution went into effect in 1789. The federal 
government had the power to collect revenue from the states,
and it could also declare treaties the law of the land, 
meaning that all states and citizens had to comply with them. 
With the increased revenue, the central government would have 
been able to pay British debts in a lump sum to the British 
government; Also, the American courts became just forums for 
Arltiah;; cfeditors; after the Constitution.*
The American government also believed that the British
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that British troops took Bopro s l i m  off American soil in 
violation of tho treaty. This led Jefferson and the British
minister Ceorge Hammond to argue over which nation broke the 
treaty first. Hammond asserted that the loyalists had been 
persecuted and no effort had been made by the American 
government for their relief, as stipulated in the treaty* 
Jefferson countered with the slave issue and then went on to 
argue that the United States government was obligated only to 
recommend to the states that they pay compensation to 
loyalists. It had done this, a.id therefore Jefferson 
contended it did not break the treaty in this area.5
The American government had the stronger case.
Jefferson demonstrated in his discussions with Hammond that
the British had broken the treaty by taking slaves.*
Furthermore, it could now provide a guarantee that there
would be Mno lawful impediment11 to debt payments or loyalist
compensation for confiscations during the war because of the
increased powers of the central government, In short, the
United States had fulfilled its obligations under the 
*
treaty. There was never a promise that British creditors 
would have their money by a certain date; the creditors’ only 
guarantee was that they would have fair recourse in seeking 
payment. But the British continued to hold the posts despite 
the new federal government's power to enforce the treaty.
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with the treaty, especially in the area of loyalist 
impediments and confiscations.5 They apparently ware not
going to turn the posts over until ail debts war# paid and 
loyalist claims handled, whan the British could have turned 
the posts over in 1792 or 1793 knowing that the claims could 
he handled in a fair manner under the Constitution. Knowing 
that the disposition of all these cases could take years, 
even under the new government, the British must have had 
other reasons to retain the posts for such an extended period 
of time.
The British government faced many problems in the 
Northwest Territory after 1783. The Indians felt abandoned 
by-the British after the treaty, the Canadians depended on 
the lucrative fur trade for income, and they also had a sense 
of anxiety about both the Americans and the Indians. They 
were not pleased that the .■■British government sacrificed their 
security and livelihood in the Treaty of Paris.* The 
government in hondon realised this, and knew that more 
problems would be created by turning the posts over to the 
Americans than if they were kept.^ This policy is clearly 
stated in the following passage, written by Lord Hav.*kesbury:
I have only to observe that as these posts are of great 
service in securing the fidelity and attachment of the 
Indians, and as they afford to Great Britain the means of 
commanding the navigation of the Great Lakes,
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hawrenc*, th«f are certainly of groat importance to the
:i&mcity of Canada, and to the lotoffgts of this coijntry, 
both in a commercial and political view. It is to be 
wished therefore they should remain in His Majesty1* 
possession, if the conduct of the United States should
continue to justify this measure on the part of Great 
Britain...11
The official British reasons for retention, although valid at 
the time, were clearly not the causes of retention. They 
were very much concerned with a possible Indian uprising, and 
the commercial interests of Canada.^
The British solution to its problems in the Northwest 
Territory was the concept or the Neutral Indian State. The 
British hoped to convince the American government to give up 
the territory ceded to them by the treaty. The policy 
stipulated that the land would not become a part of Canada, 
but rather it would be turned over to the Indians of the Six 
Nations. The forts would be turned over to them as well.
Free fur trade would be guaranteed to both the "aited States 
and Britain, and neither British nor American citizens would 
be allowed to acquire or retain land in this state.^
This project satisfied a number of British needs.
First, it protected the Canadian fur trade by insuring that 
the traders would have full access to the territory. The 
Canadian’s security with respect to the Indians would also 
have been made more secure, in that the Indians would have 
been appeased and once again convinced that the British were
interested in their needs. The British would have ie facto 
control of this state, which made the plan basically a 
retrocession of the 1783 territory back to Great Britain,
Gieat B 1 11ain hoped to promote this neutral state plan by 
offering to mediate the problems that the United States was 
having with the Indians m  the turitoty,'’
Needless to say, tdo: Arner i can government reacted coolly 
to any offer of mediation * hat Hammond made. He first 
broached the .subject with Alexander. Banul* ;n, with whom he 
had developed a close .relationship, Kami 11on basically told 
him that, the government could not. accept mediation as long a 
Britain still had possession of the posts.*' Lord Grenville, 
despite this rejection, ordered Hammond to continue to press 
the concept if there was opportunity. He thought that the 
Americans would conrider the matter further because of 
General Arthur Si. Clair * s recent defeat./5 But once again. 
Hamilton told Hammond the proposition was entirely 
unac rentable.* The I nd i an Ques 11 on wa s viewed a s" a p ur e 1 y 
American problem, and the United States government 
interpreted any offer of mediation by the British as an 
intrusion on American sovereignty, Also, the British 
government was not a disinterested party, because they still 
held the posts and were concerned about the fut trade. It 
was clear to the American government that the British would 
not hi neutral mediators.*v
After the double rejection by Hamilton, Hammond decided 
that it would be useless to talk with Jefferson about it, as 
he would be less receptive than Hamilton, and much more 
suspicious of British motives. Grenville also agreed that 
the project had gone as far as it could for the time being, 
and he decided to suspend the idea."'
After 1792, however, the posts issue become relatively 
minor to the British foreign office because of the 
radicalisat ion of the French Revolution, but it remained an 
issue of. importance to the United States-.*". Lord Grenville’s 
energies were devoted to a possible war with France, which 
began in 1793, British officials in North America were left 
without real guidance from London, and the situatrun stood 
simmering until 1794, when the problem, along with the 
infringement of .neutral.rights, almost created, war; . It. is 
important at this point to discuss some of the trade issues 
that also contributed to the war scare of 1794.
Trade Problems
If there was one issue that caused as much trouble as 
the Northwest Territory did in Anglo-American relations 
before 1795, it was trade. America, while a colony, had 
enjoyed many maritime rights under the British mercantile 
system. It could exchange goods with and carry goods to and
9from other British colonies with relatively few restrictions, 
except for British regulations against colonial manufactures. 
After the War of Independence, however, the British 
began to treat the United States like any other foreign 
nation, This meant that the American carrying trade to 
Britain and its colonies virtually ended. Shipping was a 
major industry in Great Britain, and the British did not want 
a foreign nation shipping goods to its colonies. It was a 
basic principle of the mercantile system. Britain also did 
not want the British West Indies purchasing goods from the 
United States which could be bought from Canada, because 
another key principle of mercantilism was that currency 
should be kept circulating, within the ''family.M
American merchants and shippers, however, were 
accustomed to having the tight to trade with Britain and its 
colonies, almost without restriction. The Amera,cm trading 
and shipping inf restructure had been built and maintained by 
these mercantile policies. After the war, the number of 
items that American merchants could sell to British subjects 
and territories was greatly reduced, and goods had to be 
shipped in British bottoms. This, logically enough, was a 
great blow to American commerce, especially shipping. Many 
Americans began complaining.*1
The figure who led the fight against the British system 
was James Madison, early America's great economic
nationalist. He complained that the British depended on the 
United States for necessities, such as foodstuffs; and yet 
the Americans depended on nothing from the British. His 
viewpoint is clearly stated in the following passage:
It might be regarded... , 'that -where one nation consumed 
the necessaries of life produced by another, the consuming 
nation was dependent on the producing one. The United 
States were in the fortunate situation of enjoying...these 
advantages over Great Britain. They supply a part of her 
dominions with the necessaries of life; they consume 
superfluities which give bread to her people in another 
part .k-
As Madison phrased his comments, they made sense. Britain 
and its colonies did indeed depend on the United States;
But in the early 1790s, the United States depended on Britain 
for one very important commodity - revenue. A major portion 
of Hamilton's financial plan involved revenue gained from 
import taxes. The single best source of this revenue was 
British shippers and merchants sending their goods to the 
United States, Earlier in the same address which Madison 
made to Congress, he cl aimed that Amer i can shippers and 
merchants would benefit from decreased trade with Great 
Britain, because trade and shipping would increase with other 
nations.^ But such an increase would probably not be enough 
to offset the decrease. The Americans and the British 
already had a system of trade developed. The British had a 
large empire, in which many people had to be fed, and the
10-
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Americans had a huge appetite for British manufactured goods. 
This system; could not be changed quickly. France, Holland* 
and Spain did not have the huge need for American exports 
that the British did. If the American trade system attempted 
to change its focus at this critical time, exports would 
decrease/ import revenues would dwindle, and Hamilton's 
financial plans would collapse. The United States needed 
British trade, despite its disadvantages.^
Madison had also hoped that by decreasing American 
dependence on British manufactures, America's tiny 
manufacturing base would be stimulated.^  His ideas again 
cannot be faulted on the surface; the growth of American 
manufacturing would be beneficial. But manufacturing needs 
developmental capital, and in a nation that primarily sells 
raw materials to other nations, this capital must come from 
the trade of these raw materials. The majority of this 
capital would come from British Empire, America’s best 
cus t omer. As ment ioned above, on1y Br it a i n had the capacity 
to buy as much as the Americans needed to sell.
Madison tried to retaliate against British trade 
practices with various discriminatory proposals during the 
early 1790s. Essentially, these proposals centered on extra 
import duties which would be levied on those nations that did 
not have a commercial treaty with the United States, which 
meant Great Britain^- He first attempted to pass a
discriminatory bill in April of 1789. He proposed that the 
ships of countries not in treaty with the United States would 
be charged an extra tonnage duty. He primarily wanted to 
retaliate against the British navigation laws, but he also 
hoped that the extra tonnage duty would make the British re­
exportation of American goods in Europe unprofitable, leaving 
it for American m e r c h a n t s . T h e  measure passed the House, 
but the Senate, which was dominated by the Hamiltonians, 
weakened the bill. The discriminatory nature was removed, 
leaving a fifty cent per ton duty on fo/eign ships and six 
cents per ton on American shipping. In addition, a ten 
percent reduction in the import duty was given to foreign 
goods shipped on American ships.^
The commercial interests, led by Hamilton, recognised 
the necessity of the British trade despite its unfairness.
The merchant class depended on it and the government needed 
the revenue. There was a very real fear that Britain would 
retaliate or that trade would drop, thereby losing tax 
revenue. Madisonians countered that Britain needed American 
trade and that the duties would not cause a decrease."5
Madison did not give up his hopes of forcing the British 
to open their trade after his defeat in 1789. In 1790, he 
introduced a bill that would impose a duty of one dollar on 
al 1 snips that were not in treaty with the United 'States 
This measure passed the House, which was dominated by
1 tj
Madisonians as it had been a'year earlier, Madison also 
proposed that all American produce had to be shipped in
V,American ships. * The Hamiltonians were not pleased with the 
discriminatory duty, and they were horrified by the shipping 
bill. Madison’s goal was to either force Britain to open its 
trade or make a treaty. He also hoped that the tariff would 
stimulate American industry. Hamilton and the commercial
i *class were able to stop both measures in the Senate.’*
The British claimed all along that Americans were 
treated favorably, along with other nations. They clearly 
threatened retaliation if any discriminatory duties were 
passed, and this had an effect on the Hamiltonians. It also 
worried planters in the Southern states, who would be hurt by 
retaHatory measures against their sale of foodstuffs and 
cotton to British dominions. But Great Britain did not give 
in to American demands to change its trade policies. That 
nation was in the stronger position, and had nothing to gain 
through concessions. The British government preferred to 
j^ifttein the status guo with the United States,^
But by 1793, Britain realised that the situation had 
changed. It had to fight revolutionary France. The emphasis 
of the dispute with America shifted from trade policy to 
neutral rights, Britain began to relax its strict mercantile 
policies, but at the same time, American shippers began to 
feel the effects of British regulation of neutral trade,
which seemed to the Americans to be much more odious than 
British peacetime practices.
The Neutral Trade
The rights of neutral shipping became a critical issue 
after 1793, which marked the beginning of war between Great 
Britain and Fr nee. Great Britain’s strength, as usual, was 
control of the seas. British strategy, therefore, was to 
isolate France from its overseas colonies and trading 
partners, hoping then that its continental allies could 
defeat the revolutionary armies.^
This policy, however, clashed with American interests. 
With the French merchant marine effectively destroyed, France 
was forced to open its colonial trade to neutral shippers, 
breaking its own mercantile tradition. The United States, 
with its large merchant fleet, was in an excellent position 
to carry this trade. The legal rationale behind the neutral 
trade was "free ships make free goods.11 Simply stated, it 
means that neutral ships had the right to carry non* 
contraband belligerent goods.^ This concept was completely 
unsatisfactory to Britain. If they allowed neutrals to carry 
France’s trade, its whole wartime strategy would have been 
undermined.
Britain began to rely on its old rules of war, in
14
particular the Rule of 1756. This doctrine stated that no 
belligerent power could allow a trade in wartime that it did 
not allow in pe acetime,^ This disallowed the trade between 
the United States and the French colonies which Edmond 
Charles Genet, minister of the French Republic, proclaimed 
open when he arrived in the United States in 1793, Great 
Britain also attempted to increase the number of items on the 
contraband list, hoping it would increase the number of 
neutral seizures, thus decreasing the trade of France.3,
On June 8, 1793, George III issued the first Order-in* 
Council of the war which affected American merchants, It 
authorized the seizure of any ship carrying grains to a 
French port. In fairness, the cargo was to be taken to the 
closest British port and purchased at fair market value. It 
also authorized the seizures of any ships attempting to land 
in a blockaded port, ot any ship on the high seas whose 
papers indicated that it was travel 1ing to a blockaded 
port.3* In his instructions to Hammond and in his 
correspondence with Thomas Finckney, the American ministet in 
London, Grenvi1le relied on Vattel for his proof that the 
seizure of provisions was justifiable during a war if it 
helped bring that nation to terms.35
The American response to the order centered essentially 
on the harm it oaueed the United States, especially its 
agricullure. Finckney, in a letter to Grenville, asserted
that Britain had no right to do harm to American agriculture 
and commerce because it was in a war with France. He also 
claimed that in recent years, writers of international law 
had come to accept the principle of ’’free ships make fr«e 
goods.” and that the British government its. elf accepted the 
principle in a treaty with France.
Another American complaint was that some of the seizures 
were not legal. To be sure, there were attempts to deceive 
the British, but nevertheless, some American ships were 
seised illegally, and American seamen were also impressed 
The British, at this point in the war, were not interested in 
looking at specific cases. They wanted the neutral trade 
with France stopped, and a few mistakes were better than 
allowing France to trade freely by loosening its Orders-in 
Council because of the complaints of a powerless neutral.**
The next Order in Council was issued by the British on 
November 6, 1^93. This order al lowed the sei zure of any 
vessels trading with French colonies^ which in effect 
o-iit/fcawe'd;v-ili trade between the United States and French 
colonies. '/However* because some restricted trade had been 
allowed between the United States and French colonies before 
the wary that trade could not be stopped by the celebrated 
Rule of 1756. The order was clearl.y illegal , as it 
prohibit in wartime that had been al l owed in
peacetime. When Pinckney complained to Lor about
the order, Grenville explained that it was a "temporary"
measure meant * . control neutrals while the fleet was out of
4 *
the French Wesf Indies area for a short time.
The effects of this order were severe for American 
shipping. In letters to Edmund Randolph, who had succeeded 
Thomas -Jeffers-on as Secretary of State*, Fulwar Skipwith, the 
American Consu! -'n u h  . .wrote abou*- i 11 egal seizures that he
had seen He said that at Monserat and St. Kitts, over 150 
American vessels had been seised, and some of them had simply 
been travelling from American port to American port. The 
judges of the admiralty courts, he wrote, had simply been 
assuming that the seised American vessels were attempting to 
trade with France, regardless of destination papers.
The Order of November 6 was eventual 1y replaced by the 
more liberal Order of January 8, 1794,'" but the damage tp 
American shipping and public opinion had ad -ready been done*
Be rause the Er i t ish government held t he November order secret 
for a short time, and the time it took for the original and 
supplementary orders to be transmitted, British ships began 
seizing American shipping in early 1794. As described by 
Fulwar Skipwith above, the British were vigorous in the 
execution of the order. The American government continued to 
appeal to the British for some kind of justice or 
compensation, but the British did not notice until the calls 
for war emanated from the United States Congress-.*' Even
Alexander Kami 11 on; .? ugg« . • t ed to President Washington that he 
prepare the mil itary for war .
Negotiations and the Jay Treaty.
War in 17 9 4 seemed a ceitaint y . The seizure issue was
tea rhing a dip 1 c-mat i • "c: ; t real mass.” and Lord Dorchester f s.
speech to the Indians in t he Northwe st Ter t i lory seemed
(*•clearly inflammatory to the American government.1 John 
Graves Simeoe was convinced in July of 1794f despite American 
promises to the contrary, that General Anthony Wayne was 
preparing to attack the British-held forts, not the
.4 0Indians.1’ But somehow, peace between the two nations was 
maintained. The reason for this miracle- is relatively 
simple; neither nation could afford to go to war .in71T94,
The United States needed British trade. With French 
trade being cut off by the detestable Orders in-Council/ 
trade with Britain was that much more important after 1793. 
The British Navy was systematically destroying the French 
Navy and privateers, so there was really little impediment to 
Angl©“American trade. In fact, it had blossomed. Because of 
the war, the British merchant marine was not in a position to 
dominate the trade as it had done before, and American ships 
began to catty more of the trade with Britain.^3 American 
shipping became so dominant during the war that by 1800.
American ships were carrying ninety-five percent of the trade 
between the two nations.^ Britain even allowed Americans to 
trade with its colonies during the war, despite its own 
maritime laws.** The British essential 1y were using American 
ships as a surrogate British merchant marine.
These considerations led the Washington administration 
to consider negotiations before war. The United States 
government received the majority of its revenue fror import 
duties, and most of that was coming from the British trade. 
President Washington therefore began to consider a possible 
mission to Great Britain in February of 1794 to maintain this 
vital peace. This had the definite support of the 
Federalists, but the Republicans were deeply suspicious that 
the HBritish FartyM wou1d make the Uhited Stat es a virtua1 
slave to the British,^ Despite Republican opposition, 
Washington decided to send a mission. At first, Alexander 
Hamilton was considered for the trip to London, but it was 
decided that it was more important for him to stay in the 
United States, not to mention the Republican furor his 
appointment would cause.^ Hamilton himself recommended John 
Jay for the position in April. Washington agreed and sent 
his name to the Senate. He was confirmed by a very close 
partisan vote three days later, and Jay sailed for Great 
Britain on May 12, 1794.54
Great Britain was also very interested in peace for a
number of reasons, Britain was having to rely on American 
shipping and trade because of the war. Its merchant marin* 
was needed for privateering and it was also susceptible to 
French seizure. It was logical, then/ for the British to 
give the carrying trade to neutral nations such as the United 
States. The British essentially needed a neutral America 
with which to trade, just as the United States needed
itBritain.*
The Fost Question was also solving itself. The United 
States demonstrated after 1791 that it was making honest 
attempts to fulfill its duties under the peace treaty. In 
inf ormal talks with Hamilton, Hammond found out that the 
United States would be willing to guarantee free trade across 
the American-Canadian border if Britain would turn the posts 
oter to the United States.^  Also, in July of 1793, the 
Americans f inal ly gave in to the British claim that ;■
northwest lands were not actually ceded to the United States 
in the treaty, but rather that the right to negotiate with 
the Indians for the territory was transferred to the United
6 7States. The many worries that the British government had 
about the Northwest Territory were disappearing. They would 
still have a right to the fur trade, and they did not betray 
their promise to the Indians by actually turning the land 
over to the Americans. By 1794, the Northwest Territory and 
the posts were certainly not worth the possible war to which
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they were contributing.
The greatest reason, perhaps, was the simple fact that 
Britain could not afford to fight a belligerent an another 
hemisphere, Britain would have to spread its navy even more 
than it already had, and it would have to commit troops to 
North America that it needed much more in Europe. Also, a 
belligerent United States would give the French a number of 
very good ports in which to fit out and hide privateers, 
making French predations on British shipping more effective. 
A war with the United States could not give the British any 
more concessions than it already had, and the price would be
far too dear.
For these reasons, the Jay Grenville negotiations were 
very cordial. In his letter to Grenville of July 3, Jay 
expressed his happiness Lord Grenville seemed very open and 
favorable foward the n e g o t i a t i o n s T h i s  friendliness 
lasted the entire time that Jay was in England. The treaty 
took a little less than five months to conclude from start to 
finish, which was another testament to the desire of both 
sides to avoid war and to heal wounds. And the wounds were 
healed; the British were satisfied in that a commission was 
created to handle the debt issue, they did not give up 
regulation of neutral trade or impressment, and war was 
averted.^ The United States finally got the northwest 
posts, a commercial treaty, and trade with the British East
Indies was opened to American merchants. Trade with the 
British increased by three hundred percent over the next ten 
years, and this put the United States cn very sound financial 
footing, and on the way to prosperity.^
But the treaty was not perfect for the United States.
Although it stabilised relations with the British/ it put 
relations with the French in a very precarious position. In 
the three years after the signing of the Jay Treaty, 
relations with France gradually deteriorated into war. The 
treaty had taken on a greater importance than simple 
stability in Anglo*Ametican relations; it began a series of 
events that would preoccupy the foreign relations of the 
United States for the next six years.
CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION:
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BEFORE RANDOLPH’S DOWNFALL
Relations with France were generally better before 1975 
than with Great Britain. Almost all Americans openly 
sympathized with the French Revolution as it began, and 
conser valive opini on t u rned aga i nst 1 1 on 1y after Louis XVI 
was beheaded and the French Republic was declared, becau.se 
they wore concerned about the excesses of mass politics 
without strong leadership. But even after this event, the 
vast majority of Americans continued to support the 
Revolution,
There were troubles, however, which tended to increase
after war was declared against Great Britain in February of 
1793. France was concerned that it was net being treated
fairly by Hamilton’s pro-British trade practices, and the 
pro-French neutrality that France expected from-the-Uni ted 
States during its war with Britain never materialized. 
Strict American neutrality angered the French, and it was a 
contributing factor to the decline in Franco-American
relations after 1793.
I will argue that this decline in Franco“American 
relations happened because the foreign policies of the two
republics were essentially dissimilar. The United States was 
not interested in spreading revolutionary ideology throughout 
the world as the Girondist government was. It was in the
tinited States' interest to seek closet commercial ties with 
Great Britain. It needed to place itself on a strong 
economic footing. France could not offer the economic 
opportunities for the United States that the British could. 
Fiance expected the United States government to unite with it 
in republican brotherhood, helping France when it could by 
allowing the sale of price and so on. What it found was an 
American government which knew its interests, and followed 
them without remorse. The French government did not like 
this ’'betrayal" of republicanism by the Americans, and it 
grew more hostile as the United States continued on its p:rg^.
cMith the ratification of the Jay Treaty,
Franoe a 11 but abrogated its treaties with its ally that had 
abandoned it to form an al1 lance with its greatest enemy.
Relations with France before War
Relations with France were warm before the beginning of 
war with Great Britain. American public opinion was pro- 
French, and the administration had not yet faced the 
neutrality issue and the activities of one Edmond Charles 
Genet. Perhaps the greatest difficulty before 1793 was the
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fact that Alexander Hamilton was not as responsive to French 
calls for a new commercial treaty and increased trade as the 
French government would haveliked.^
The French wanted increased trade for a number of 
reasons. First, the United States would have been an 
excellent market for French manufactured goods, as well as a 
good source for raw materials. In short, it was good 
business to trade with the United States. Second, the French
would have liked nothing more than to decrease American trade
*
with Great Britain.* This accomplished the dual French goals 
of doing harm to British trade and removing the United States 
from the British sphere of economic influence.*
The French hoped for a new treaty based on mutual 
guarantee, which basically meant that each nation was obliged 
to grant the other identical trade concessions. For example, 
if the French government allowed American shippers to enter 
ftench ports duty- ire#, then French ships ihoulf be a1 lowed 
into American ports on the same duty-free level.* This was 
never to he because Hamilton, as mentioned in Chapter One, 
had based his entire plan for American economic prosperity on 
revenues from British trade, and he did not want to do 
anything that would endanger this trade. This is not to say 
that he was against increasing trade with France, but he was 
more interested in maintaining and increasing economic ties 
with the British. He was interested in a new trade treaty
with France primarily because he hoped he could use a new 
French treaty to force the British into a commercial treaty,/ 
Despite the wishes of the Jeffersonians and the French; 
negotiations were never begun. The Washington administration 
was never interested enough, and by the time Thomas Jefferson 
had developed a proposal based on mutual guarantee, war had 
begun and such treaty notions were out of the guest ion.*
Another trade issue that caused some minor problems in 
the relationship was the French expectation that the American 
government would discriminate against British trade in the 
form of tonnage duties. But Hamilton, ever committed to 
British trade and goodwill, was able to remove the 
discriminatory nature of Madison’s tonnage bills in 1790 and 
1791 (see Chapter One). Louis~0ui11aume Otto, the French 
charge d ’affaires, wrote letters to Jefferson in January df 
1791, stating that ; France'.*' in having to pay a tonnage duty^ 
was not being treated in accordance with the most-favored 
nation clause of the Treaty of Commerce (1778). Jefferson, 
in his reply, correctly stated that no nation was'treated 
more favorably than France, But Jefferson was sympathetic 
toward the French, because they had granted major concessions 
to American shipping and simply wanted their actions 
reciprocated* He suggested that Congress give special 
tonnage concessions to the French, but Hamilton stopped it, 
arguing that the United States needed the revenue**- This
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reiectton aav<- the French even more reason 
lv the "British Par 4* yM is *.h* T!nit-1 State 
d i d o t h e 1p i e 1 * * ions w i t h t h e Washing on
to fee: betrayed 
and it certainly 
admi hist, i at i on .
American public opinirn, however, was generally pi o-
Ft  e r i e h . In 1 7 9 1 and I 7 9 2 V  Or e a t  B r i t a i n - w a s  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r e d
t h e  enensy and Ft a n c e was the g r e a t  n a t i o n  th'*- t ashed to
Am#rica*c side to help defeat tyranny. Of course, the 
Jeffersonians tended to be more supportive of the revolution, 
because they f* it a brotherhood with fellow revolutionaries 
that the soon to-be Federalists did not. Nevertheless, the 
sen: ervalives n the United Stater •: i . supporti ve, but, 
worried about the problems that would be created if the 
revolution radicalised.
.By. the. end of i792, the worries of the conservatives had 
been coni i t  med ' R ad i -: a 1 s a i r ez ♦ -d ■ t he i r k i ng , . I, oui s' XV1, and 
beheaded him. The constitutional'monarchy was abolished, and 
the French Repufclic was declared, which promised to .free :t:he 
citisens of the world from the chains that absolute monarchy
and Catholicism had created^ To the ccnservatives, this was 
exactly the kind of radicalization of the revolution that 
they did not want to happen,* The new Girondist government 
then began the wars of "liberation” on the continent, which 
soon included Great Britain. Conservatives in the United 
States were very much concerned that the new government in 
France would try to spread its revolutionary economic and
social ideologies throughout the western hemisphere as well, 
endangering the interests of the United States.
The Jeffersonians viewed th* declaration of the Republic 
as a high point in the history of man. At last, another 
nation had become free by throwing off its oppressive ruler. 
Jefferson wrote a letter to Wiiiram Short soon after the 
declaration of the Republic, praising the french Republic and 
the revolutionaries who created it. The letter reads in 
part:
...But time and truth will rescue and embalm their 
memories, while their [the French revolutionaries*] 
p ferity wi 11 be enjoying that very liberty for which 
t,.ey would have never hesitated to offer up their lives. 
The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue 
of the contest, and was ^ver such as prize won with so 
little innocent blood? ...
This was the sentiment of the majority of Americans at this 
time, and this feeling was the source of domestic difficulty 
in that the French Revolution can be considered the 
ideological cause of the first party split in the United 
States. Americans began to divide into Federalist and 
Democratic-Republican camps on this issue, as well as on 
other issues such as economic and foreign policy. This 
growing political division only became greater in the Spring 
of 17S3 with the arrival of the new French minister, Edmond 
Charles Genet, and the debate on neutrality.
MM
Genet and Neutrality in 1793
: Bel at idhs-- wi t h France -in 1^93 immediat.ol y a! t er the war 
rr. Europe we i - sti 11 very good, and much better than they 
were with Great Britain. But there was growing potential for 
t rouh1e . h i 1 members of the admihis t r ation f e11 that the 
United Stater should be neutral in the conflict between 
France and Great "Britain. France, however, was expecting a 
friendly United states that-would hatbor its privateers and 
allow the rale of prizes in its ports, and real problems 
between the two nations began when American policy ran 
.headlong into French expectations.
The first issue on which the admi r i sir. a*i on had to 
decide wi.- neutrality. All four cabinet members agreed that 
neutrality was the best course, but Jefferson and Hamilton 
argued or, the specifics.** Hamilton was in favor, of a 
stricter neutrality that would included a suspension of the 
debt payments and treaties until the political situation in 
France was clarified. He also believed that a qualified 
acceptance of Genet was warranted, because if he were 
accepted fully, it would imply an acceptance of the new 
French government and the treaties.^ Jefferson believed 
that relations with the new republic should be normalized, 
the debt payments and treaties upheld, and Genet accepted 
unconditionally. He would also have preferred the neutrality
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policy to b<* tacit. rather thm declared, believing that would 
have given the United Stafec mote room to negotiate with the
K *.
warring powers.*'
The Proclamation of Neutrality was issued by President 
Washington on April 22c 1793. It was essentially a 
compromise between the roci ti ons of Jefferson and Kami 1 ton *
The treaties were recognised, but the proclamation was far 
stricter an 1 formal than what /Jefferson and the' Repufel i cans 
would have 1 iked.^
It was under these conditions that the new French 
ministerEdmond Charles Genet , arrived m  the United States, 
He landed in Charleston on April 8, and he did not make his 
way immed i a t e 1 y to Phi 1adeiphia. By 1 andi ng at Chariest on, 
he hoped to take advantage of the pro-French sentiment which 
dominated most of the United States. Before leaving for 
Phi 1ade1ph i a , he con tract ed Amer i can sailors to serve on 
French ships, made arrangements to fit out French privateers 
in Charleston, began to raise an army for a possible invasion 
of Louisiana, and also gave letters of marque to American 
ships for use against British ships. All of these activities 
would eventually be illegal under the proclamation, but he 
nevertheless continued his activities after the proclamation, 
which angered President Washington and drove the American
• tgovernment closer to a "British Neutrality.'* When he 
finally arrived in Philadelphia, his reception by the
administration was rather cool.
The most contentious issues during Genet*s ien re were 
the outfitting of French privateers in American ports and the 
French demand to set up prise courts in the United States. 
Neither was actually allowed by the Treaties of 1778, but 
Genet claimed that because the privileges were denied to the 
British in those treaties, they were given to the French. In 
an exchange with Genet during May and Jine of 1793 over t h e  
question of the seised British ship Grange, J e f f e r s o n  claimed 
that the sale of captured prises in a neutral nation's ports 
was a breach of that nation's sovereignty and could not
allowed.^ He did agree, in accordance with Article XVII of
the Treaty of Commerce, that French warships, along wi 
their prizes, did have the right to enjoy safe harbor in 
American ports, but that no where did it say that French 
warships had the right to dispose of prises in American
porta
Another problem was the commissioning of American 
citizens to serve aboard French vessels. This controversy 
came to a head when two American citizens were arrested for 
serving on French vessels. Edmund Randolph argued that 
Americans could not serve on belligerent ships while the 
United States was neutral because it violated treaties that 
the nation had with the other belligerent powers. The United 
States was neutral, so its citizens were neutral also.*'
Genet asserted that there was no law prohibiting Arneticans 
? r -'ir* serving on foreron.'shipL:,. to they eommi tied no cr ime V~‘V 
The ease was brought to trial, ind a pro ftfnch jury 
delivered a not guilty verdict.. Because Genet support ed the 
defendants di r e c 1 1 y , and Parido 1 ph had been t ho p i u5 eoutot , 
Gen"f took this decision as a victory over the 
ad'ninis t r at i on , and a sure sign t o h j m t hat t he Amer i can 
peopl e did act support the policies of the administration;^'' 
Filled with revolutionaiy i 1 e a 1 i;m and t he p e r c eiv ed backing 
oft he Arne rlean pub11 c . Genet con t in ued to recruit Ame r i can 
sailors and fight with the Washington administration, 
believing that he was protected by American public opinion,
These incidents between the administration and Genet led 
to open warfare by the summer of 1793. Genet continued to 
recruit Americans and arm privateers. One specific case was 
the Petite Demccrate, which was a refit British merchant ship 
called the Little Sarah. Genet was planning on letting the 
ship loose on British shipping in July of 1793 until 
Jefferson heard about it. He realized that if this ship, 
which was known beyond any doubt to have been outfitted in 
the United States, were to capture a British vessel, it could 
mean war between the United States and Great Britain. He 
askedGenet not to release the ship, but Genet allowed it to
George Hammond fortunately did not press the issue and
war was not declared on the United States. But the epis0(^ e 
did ruin tenet’s relationship with the American government 
once and 'Jot al I . Washingt on began to £ oil ow Hami 11 on* s prc> 
British neiitrality much more than he had in the past, 
Washington Was convinced by late July of 1793 that Oenet had 
t o be removed.“ Even Jefferson was very displeased with 
Genet's behavior, and he abandoned Genet in July as well, 
h a t e r on August 16, 1793, he wrote a letter to Gouverneur - ■ 
Morris, then minister to France, outlining Genet * s constant 
violations of American law, and then on the 23rd of the same 
month, asked Morris to discuss the possibility of Genet’s 
recall with the French government.. " Genet had also begun 
threatening to appeal over the head of George Washington to 
the American people, claiming that the administration did not 
represent the views of the American people. These actions 
final 1y turned American opinion against him. Americans were 
disgusted with Genet's threat toward their Revolutionary 
Hero, and even most Republicans rallied to the side of 
Washington.^
Although Genet attempted to clear his name by telling 
Jefferson that he was only obeying orders"5 and by suing John 
Jay and Rufus King, the men who had accused him of 
threatening the President's authority, Genet's days were 
numbered. The Jacobins had taken power in France earlier 
that summer, and Genet was a Girondist. So when Mori is had
asked for Genet’s recall in October, the Jacobins granted it 
happi1y.—
Genet’s plans on Louisiana were also a matter of concern 
for the United States government, but they took place mere 
secretly and therefore were not noticed as much o. his dir^t 
violations of American law. The Girondist government ordered 
Genet to organize an' invasion force and take ■ Lo-u-i s i.ana. from 
its new enemy, Spam, .As soon as . he, landed in.Charieston, he 
began to recruit a volunteer army for this mission,1 Most 
westerners approved, of the concept., because they were pro- 
French and thought that it would be a g G  opportunity to 
gain the navigation of the Mississippi. Genet was able.to 
enlist Americans such as George Rogers Clark and James 
Wilkinson to help command the invasion. Once the United 
States government heard about the invasion plan, Jefferson 
immediately warned the westerners that such a plan was 
illegal and they would be hanged if found guilty of 
participating.J!
Despite the warnings of the United States government, 
the invasion was preparing to attack when Genet was replaced, 
The Jacobins decided not to pursue the matter . jacobin 
foreign policy was more conservative than Girondist policy. 
Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety were much more 
concerned with winning the war in Europe, which had begun to 
go badly for the French after its ini.£iaL.l. .successes in 1792.
Joseph Fauchet, the new French minister, was ordered by the 
Jacobins to dismantle the army and the dangelr Louisiana 
passed. But even if Genet had not been replaced, it won 1d 
Aave been difficult to carry out the invasion. Genet had no 
money to finance the scheme, because Haffiilton had refused to
advance the debts payments to France, the very funds which
0. / :
were going to be used for the invasion,"
The Effects of Neutrality and Jay’s Mission
The Girondists and later the Jacobins were naturally 
qu11e disturbed o v er the Arnerican government *s comm1 1men t to 
strict neutrality. They had expected Genet to be far more 
successful in gaining rights for French warships, as well as 
in his invasion plans . But instead, the Urn ted States did 
not favor the French at all, and it seemed to the Jacobins in 
1794 that it was much more interested in pursuing an alliance 
with Great Britain. The Americans were willing to accept 
British neutral doctrine embodied in the '’Rule of 17 56” 
rather than the "free ships make free goods” principle of the 
Franco-American alliance, thereby making it more,1 difficult 
for France to supply both itself and its possessions. It 
seemed to the French government by November of 1794 that the 
American government was no longer committed to an alliance 
with France, and was well on its way toward an alliance with
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the British.
Genet had been officially recalled in January of 1794. 
His replacement, Joseph Fauchet, arrived the next month, and 
he began his duties almost immediately. Morris, whose recall 
had also been requested, was replaced by the pro-French James 
Monroe later that year, in an effort by Washington to placate 
the French government. Both of these men would play key 
roles in the development and ratification of the Jay Treaty, 
which led to the further decline of French-American relations 
in 1794 and 1795.
French behavior actually moderated for a time after 
Fauchet arrived. The French began to conform to America1s 
definition of neutrality, in that Fauchet did not outfit 
privateers or enlist American seamen. Fauchet reali zed that 
Genet was very unsuccessful in playing poiitics in America, 
and he wanted to avoid this. Also, France was in dire need 
of American aid. The British had al1 but stopped the French 
carrying trade, and France was having a very difficult time 
obtaining food. The Republic was also in desperate need of 
money, so it was forced to be more understanding of the 
American position, as it could not afford to make an enemy of 
the United States at that time.'0
This attempt at friendliness did not last long, however. 
Fauchet requested advance payment of the debt in Match of 
1794, but President Washington declined to make the
advance.3* Earlier, in July of 1793, the French had 
officially made American ships subject to seizure under their 
decree of Hay 9, 1793.“' This violated the Treaties of 1778, 
but the French reasoned that the Americans should attempt to 
understand their maritime situation. The French claimed that 
the United States did not try to defend its neutral rights 
against British violations , and therefore 1 rench shipping was 
put at a huge disadvantage. The French had to counteract 
this disadvantage by attempting to capture all neutral 
shipping:-going to Britain, which unfortunately, was dominated 
by the United States.' Although this decree took effect 
before Fauchet became minister, the illegal seizures still 
made Fauchet*s job of improving relations more difficult.
The biggest problem with which Fauchet had to contend 
was John Jay's negotiations with Lord Grenv*l1e . Although he 
had been assured by Randolph that Jay had been instructed not 
to interfere with any of the provisions in the Treaties of 
1778, they were nevertheless a matter of concern. Couverneur 
Morris and James Monroe in France had also tried, without 
success, to convince the Committee of Public Safety that the 
United States still held its alllance with France dear, The 
actual course of the relationship, however, told a different 
story to the French, The administration seemed to be 
transforming into the puppet of the British. The Americans 
had not protested British depredations on its shipping
scrongly enough, and Alexander Hamilton seemed to believe 
that British trade was more important than the French 
alliance. The United States did not allow Prance to outfi 
privateers or set up prise courts in the United States as 
France thought was its right. Hamilton had not shown a deep 
interest in a new trade treaty with France. Finally, John 
Jay had been sent to London to discuss an alliance with its 
greatest enemy. To the Committee of Public Safety, it 
definitely seemed as though the United States was not 
committed to friendship and alliance at all.
In all truth, by Hay of 1794, when John Jay had begun 
his voyage to Britain, the Washington administration was much 
more interested in maintaining a relationship with the 
British than with the French. The activities of Citizen 
Genet and the advice of Alexander Hamilton had made President 
Washington not so much pro-British, but anti-French. He was 
insulted by the attacks made by Genet on him and his 
administration, and Genet had done much to increase the party 
split that had begun in 1791 over Hamiltonian fiscal policy. 
If he had to be dragged into a faction, he would certainly 
not side with the dishonorable ’’French Party,” which had 
supported Genet and also attacked him personal 1y.
Matters worsened after November of 1794, when the Jay 
Treaty was signed. Although it did not technically break the 
Treaties of 1778, the French government and Fauchet
. 11/ ISiil M ■■ : ■
complained that it had. Also, throughout the latter portion 
of 1794 and into 179$, Fauchet complained of instances in 
which British warships were allowed to land in American ports 
with prizes. These events led the French to question 
American commitment to the alliance more than ever."
Fauchet *s constant complaints and grievances began to grate 
on ;he administration and Washington saw shades of Genet in 
Fauchet. by mid --1795. In fact . as the Senate was debating 
Jay’s Treaty in special session during June, Fauchet did 
actively attempt to defeat the treaty before the arrival of 
his replacement, Pierre Adet.-* Despite Fauchet/s efforts, 
the treaty passed the Senate and went on to President 
Washington for ratification in late June.
President Washington had problems with the Jay Treaty,
It certainly was not very favorable toward the United States, 
and it was causing huge difficulties with France. The treaty 
was cementing the political divisions in American public 
opinion, and he was coming under increasingly stronger 
attack. The insults and the attacks on his character wounded 
the President greatly, but he became more and more convinced 
that the Jay Treaty was good for the United States, as he 
assessed the alternatives to it.!e By July he had made up 
Ills mind to ratify and he did so on August 14, 1795. In the 
fyes of the Republicans, he had become a full Federalist, a 
puppet of the British.3:7'
There have been connections made between the Randolph 
controversy and Washington’s ratification of the treaty. But 
in letters that he wrote well before August 14, he writes 
about his resolve to ratify the treaty despite the public 
outrage toward the it. He did not decide to ratify the 
treaty because of Randolph's letter. He had already mad* his 
decision. Washington did not have any choice but to force 
Randolph out of the Cabinet. The letter to Pauchet. was very 
incriminating. It did look to Washington that a bribe was 
indeed solicited. Randolph had compromised the American 
government and had to be removed. Hammond had forwarded the 
letter to Wolcott with the purpose of influencing the 
president1® decision on ratification, but he had already made 
up his mind. The treaty would have been ratified even if the 
letter had never been received by Washington.
Ratification of the treaty was the deathkneil for the 
Franco-American alliance. The French government saw no 
alternative but to try to encourage th* defeat of the treaty 
in the House of Representatives, and when that did not work, 
it tried to influence the Election of 1796 in France’s favor. 
It knew that it could no longer work with the current 
administration. Interference in American affairs hurt 
relations even more, and even though war was not a certainty 
at that point, the chances of it were greatly increased by 
the actions of the French government.
CHAPTER THREE
MUTUAL INTEREST AND OPPORTUNITY:
RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN, 1795-1800
Jay's Treaty helped Anglo-Americans relation* after 1795 
tremendously. It was responsible for the evacuation of the 
northwest posts, increases in trade with the British Empire, 
and the termination of the threat of war. But there were 
other reasons for the improvement of the association, which 
were more influential than the treaty. The most important of 
which was the fact that Great Britain needed a friendly 
United States. Because of the war, Great Britain needed 
American shipping to cover the incapacity of the British 
fleet. The most lucrative trade concessions, such as the 
opening of the British West Indies and the allowance of the 
reexport trade were not included in the Jay Treaty. They 
were, in fact, granted unilaterally by the British to-.-help 
their own cause, and it was these concessions that would 
cause problems later in the relationship when they were 
revoked because the war had ended and Britain could return to 
its mercantile policies.
The granting of trade concessions was not the only way 
that the British attempted to maintain friendly relations.
The British government also worked very hard with the
American government to solve persistent issues such is 
spoliation compensation, the American debt problem, and the 
St. Croix boundary dispute. The two governments also worked 
closely in America’s Quasi-War with France. Britain helped 
to arm American fortifications and both governments labored 
to remove French influence in Santo Domingo and gain its 
valuable trade. It was a time of great cooperation between 
the two nations, but because of Britaih’s need for the United 
States was only temporary, it did not last. The 
’ pprochement was, in the end, opportunistic.
The Effects of the jay Treaty
The most important effect cc the Jay Treaty was 
stabilization. The diplomatic crisis of 1794 was solved.
The posts were finally tc be evacuated in 1796, the fur trade 
question was resolved, and the debt and spoliation issues 
were settled. A trade treaty was also granted to the United 
States, which had been an American hope since the ending of 
the War for Independence. Both governments realized that war 
in 1794 would be devastating, and they acted to stop it.
The evacuation of the posts and fur trade were connected 
issues. Britain did not want to release the posts to the 
Americans without some sort of guarantee that Canadians could 
continue to take furs out of the area. In discussions with
Hamilton, George Hammond had learned that the United States 
would be willing to open the area to traders on both sides of 
the bolder (see Chapter One). This was granted in the 
treat/. Also, Britain ridded itself of its territorial 
promises to the Indians when the United States government
1
agreed to assume the British responsibility in this area.*
By the time the Jay Treaty was signed, Great Britain's 
demands in the Northwest Territory had been satisfied and it 
had no further use for the posts, so they gladly surrender^.! 
them to the United States in 179'>.
Two other issues that were reaching critical proportions 
were American complaints about 11 legal seizures and British 
complaints about the manner in which Americans were honoring 
their debts to British creditors. The Jay Treaty set up bi- 
national commissions to judge claims dealing with both 
issues. Also, in the spirit of goodwill, British seizures of 
American shipping were greatly decreaseu while the treaty was 
being negotiated.^ The exact nature and the events 
surrounding these commissions, as well as the commission 
charged with resolving the St.. Croix boundary, will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
Another positive effect of the *Jay Treaty was that it 
was also a coRwercial treaty, the British government had 
f|lia;ij::y;';.d#9idad that not having a trade treaty with the 
United States was not worth all the trouble it was creating.
Britain realized that it would still be the senior partner in 
any commercial relationship with the United States, and also 
that it only needed to give the United States relatively 
minor concessions. A trade treaty with the United States was 
beneficial for Britain.
The most valuable concessions that Britain granted to 
the United States were the British East Indies trade and 
most - favored nation trade status. The East Indies trade was 
very valuable and American shippers soon began to rival
British shippers in the area . Arne rleans accord.!ng to the 
treaty were not allowed to export Indian items to any ports 
except those in the Uni ted States. This rule, however, was 
violated constantly because iritis!* policy allowed a de facto 
reexport trade to occur.* The reexport trade will be 
discussed later.
Jay and Grenville also negotiated mutual most-favored 
nation trade status. This greatly increased trade between 
both nations. Great Britain no longer had to be concerned 
with possible American discrimination, so exports to the 
United States increased. Prom 179S to 1801, the United 
States imported one hundred sixty million more dollars worth 
of goods from Britain than it did from Prance.4 Britain 
relied on the United States primarily for commodities such as 
cotton, tobacco, and in some years foodstuffs. The British 
West Indies continued to depend on the United States for food
as well. The value of exports to Britain rose by three 
hundred percent from 1795 to 1800, due in large part to the 
commercial treaty.5
It is clear that the Jay Treaty was beneficial for both 
sides. Trade increased on both sides of the Atlantic, and 
relations were much more relaxed than they were in 1794, But 
there were some major disadvantages for the United States,
The greatest of these disadvantages, the infamous 
Article XII, never became a part of the treaty. This 
commercial article allowed Americans to trade directly with 
the British West indies, so long as the ships were no larger 
than seventy tons. While this was a major disadvantage, 
there were even more serious problems with the article. It 
prohibited the "carrying any Helasses, Sugar, Coffee, Cocoa, 
or Cotton in American vessels eithot from His Majesty’s 
Islands or from the United States, to.any part of the 
World,"" This would prohibit the export of any American 
cotton for the duration of the article. In short, it was
clearly unacceptable to American interests and this 
particular article was struck from the treaty by the Senate.
The United States was also forced to relinquish the 
principle of "free ships, free goods," which all small 
neutral merchant nations advocated, in favor of the British 
definition of contraband. The British government realised it 
a^d:--^ o^ ;i!^ jjie some concessions to the United States to avoid
war and maintain friendship, but it was not foolish enough to 
yield one of its most important maritime weapons against 
France, The surrender of this principle was one of the main 
causes of troubles with France, as the Directory saw the 
action as another demonstration that the Federalists were the 
puppets of the British and clearly uncommitted to helping 
America's ally in its war against their mutual foe.
Trade with Great Britain
The American carrying trade prospered not cnly because 
of the opening of the East Indies through Jay's Treaty, but 
also because Britain voluntarily allowed trade that it had 
not allowed before. Britain was forced to allow American 
ships to supply the Eritish West Indies with American 
foodstuffs, because the wax in Europe had incapacitated the 
British carriers in the West Indies. Also, the British 
decided to allow an American reexport trade to develop. Both 
of these trades contributed greatly to the increase in 
American trade and pi asperity before the end of the war in 
1802.
The British West Indies were dependent cn the United 
States for raw materials, For much of the time after the War 
for Independence, .Britain forced American merchants to ship 
these goods to the West indies in British ships, in keeping
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with mercantile policy.':* The Wars of the French Revolution 
compelled Britain to change its policies, however. As the 
war in Europe began in 1793, American ships carried sixteen 
percent of the grain exported to the West Indies. By 1794, 
the Americans carried a total of eighty-eight percent, of the 
grain.- Early on, American ships were allowed to expert only 
provisions, but soon alter they were shipping manufactures 
and other goods, some of it being reexported British goods. 
The governors of the islands would also allow the Americans 
to ship island products like coffee and sugar back to the 
United States.’5 It was all very lucrative for the 
Americans,
The West -Indies ■ trade became so common because the Home 
Government would, not rescind the orders of the island 
governors which opened the British islands to American ships. 
The Home Government tacitly accepted the proclamations, 
although it did try to stop the export of sugar and coffee in 
American ships, with little effect.1’ It was much easier for 
the British government in London to allow the vital American 
trade la this unofficial manner, rather than declaring it 
official policy and having to deal with the conservative 
backlash of British mercantilists. The British government 
Nould also be able to reneunce an unofficial policy more 
easily when the war ended and it could return to a more 
traditiona1 mercanti1e po1iay.^
Attempts)/ Rufus King, the new minister in London, to 
open the West Indies trade officially were unsuccessful, The 
British were not willing to officially break with their 
mercantile policies. The Americans also failed in convincing 
the British to allow American ships to carry goods directly 
between the British Isles and its colonies. That, would also 
have been too much of a radical departure from accepted 
practice.^ The British were not changing their policies to 
make ne American shipping industry wealthy; they were doing 
it out of necessity.
The reexport trade was allowed for similar reasons. 
Reexportation, simply defined, was the act of American 
merchants shipping goods into the United States, and then 
shipping them to another country, This activity was 
prohibited by the Rule of 1756, is no country with 
mercantilist traditions could allow a foreign country to ship 
its goods or the goods of its colonies. During war, however, 
the situation changed. Britain hoped * hat the United States 
would use reexportation for two major purposes. The first 
was that Britain wanted American merchants to ship goods from 
the french West Indies to Great Britain via the United 
States, so that it could get goods that it needed and deny 
goods to the french at the same time. The second purpose was 
to oreate a reexport trade from British areas to British 
areas via the United States, in this instance, Great Britain
was using the American merchant fleet to do work that the 
British fleet could not do at that time.^
The reexportation ♦rade. as can be imagined, was not 
popular in Great Britain, The British East India Company 
protested because the United States was importing many Indian 
goods into the United States and then reexporting them to 
foreign countries, including Britain. They felt that this 
trade with Britain should be exclusively theirs,^ British 
shippers likewise were angered over the fact that American 
shippers were purchasing British manufactured goods and 
reexporting them to the British West Indies, m  violation of 
mercantile policy,1^
The British government, however, supported the reexport 
trade in the decisions of Sir William Scott and its own 
Orders-in-Counei1. The Order of January 8, 1794* disallowed 
any neutral carriage of French colonial goods to France, but 
it allowed neutral goods to be shipped to both places. So if 
an American merchant purchased French goods and shipped them 
to the United States, and then exported his goods to a French 
possession, it was legal. Later in the Imnvanuel and Roily 
decisions, Scott held that the reexport trade was legal* so 
long as the importation of enemy goods into the neutral 
country was legitimate* meaning there had to be proof that 
the goods were actually purchased by a neutral shipper or 
merchant before they were reexported.^
The Treaty Commissions
In order to dispose of three major issues of 
controversy, the treaty provided for commissions which would 
resolve the ir'ie&, The Fifth Article created a commission 
of three to decide which river on the Canadian-American 
border was the "true” St. Croix, the border established in 
the Treaty of Paris (1783). A commission of five was to meet 
in Philadelphia to judge the debt claims of British 
creditors, as per the Sixth Article. The third commission, 
which assembled in London, was created by the Seventh Article 
to judge the claims of American merchants that their ships 
and cargoes were seized illegally under the various British 
Orders-in-Council.^
The least controversial of the commissions was the one 
that was charged to decide the "true" St. Croix for boundary 
purposes. It was the only one of the three that did not have 
to chose its last member by lot, as both the American 
Commissioner, David Howel1, and the Briton Thomas Barclay, 
mutually agreed on Egbert Benson, an American.^ The 
American contention was that the St. Croix was a river known 
as Magaquadavic. Timothy Pickering argued that the pence 
treaty had assumed that the river would form a part of the 
United States' eastern boundary. Therefore, the river would 
have to flow north-south, which the Magaquadavie did. the
British claim of the Schoodie River, which was to the south 
of the American claim, flowed basically east-west.2* The 
commission began its work in 1796, exploring the two rivers 
in question. After their research; the commission departed 
and agreed to meet in Boston in August of 1797. In 1797, the 
British commissioner wished to study French historical 
accounts of the area, believing that they could shed light on 
the subject. So the commissioners closed 'their meeting in 
Boston, deciding to meet in June of 1798 in Providence, Rhode 
Island for the final decision after the documents had been 
examined,"* These historical documents did identify the 
Schoodic as the St. Croix.22 After an exploration of the 
Schoodic and its tributaries, the commissioners with Robert 
Liston, the British minister, compromised on the northern 
tributary, the Chiputneticook, as the boundary. The 
agreement was signed on October 25, 17 98.25'
The Debt Commission, -hich met in Philadelphia, was the 
least successful of the three commissions. It first met on 
Hay 29, 1797, and suspended meetings on July 19, 1799 without 
concluding its business. The claims which were left unjudged 
in 1799 were disposed of in the Convention of January 8,
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The commission was composed of five members. There were 
two Americans, Thomas Fitxsimons and James Innes, who were 
joined by Thomas Macdonald and Henry Pye Rich. John
Guillcmard, a Briton, was selected fey lot as the fifth 
commissioner after the first four could not come to mutual 
agreement. Samuel Sitgreaves replaced the American James
Innes on August 11, 1798 after his death. Similar procedures 
were followed by the Spoliation Commission to select its 
fifth member ,25
Problems arose in Philadelphia for very understandable 
reasons. The British commissioners wanted to set rules tor 
the commission that would make it much easier for creditors 
to collect debts. In particular, Thomas Macdonald wanted to 
make the definition of "legal impediment" toward the 
collection of debt very broad, thereby greatly increasing the 
number of valid claims.^ The Americans opposed this 
resolution, knowing that they would have to pay much more 
money than if it were more difficult to prove that there fpi 
a legal impediment to collection.
The conflict over the impediment definition became 
critical in the case of Daniel Dulany. Briefly stated,
Daniel Dulany was the recipient in the will of a woman who 
had died in 1775. During the war, the state of Maryland 
passed a law stating that a creditor was required to accept 
any tender that the debtor offered in payment of debt, or the 
debt would be extinguished and the security that had been 
given to the creditor to guarantee the debt would have to be 
returned. So when executor of the will attempted to collect
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the money, he was forced to accept paper money which on its 
face was equal to the debt, hut was in fact greatly 
depreciated. But because the debt was paid in full with the 
paper, Dulany had no legal recourse in which to receive full 
payment. Dulany therefore brought the case before the
51commission, hoping to receive relief,1
The British, represented by Macdonald, held that in 
order for the debt to be paid fairly, the creditor could not 
be forced to accept paper money that he knew was not worth 
the whole d e b t I n  short, they believed that the Maryland 
law was a legal impediment to the collection of the full 
debt. Fitzsimons, protesting for the Americans, wrote that 
the debt had been fairly disposed of and that the commission 
had no jurisdiction. He also threatened to leave the board 
in order to prevent the British decision, which the Americans 
did on January 11, 1799,
This case, which was heard in August of 1798, could be 
considered the breaking point of the commission. After this, 
the members of the board simply could not agree with each 
other on even the principles and rules they used to judge 
claims. There were other cases, such as that of Bishop 
Inglis and Andrew Alien, which only added fuel to the growing 
fire. Finally, in July of 1799, Fit2simons and Sitgreaves 
wrote a very short letter to the British contingent stating 
that they could no longer attend the commission.^ After a
month of spirited letter-Mritint, Henry Pye Rich wrote the 
board on Septembers that he would be travel I m g  back to 
Great Britain, putting an end to the commission once and for 
all .3! ;;
Immediately after hearing that Rich was going back to 
England, Pickering wrote to Rufus King and ordered him to 
open negotiations with Lord Grenville with the purpose of 
disposing of the rest of the debt claims,3* At first, the 
British government declined to do so, because they felt that 
the split of the commission was caused by the American 
government. The British wanted to create another board under 
Article VI to handle the rest of the claims. Grenville was 
dismayed in part because the conditions of Article VII had 
been carried out so well.33 But at the same time Grenvi11e 
was talking with Xing, he was also discussing the possibility 
of a lump sum payment with British creditors. It was decided 
that a fair amount would be approximately two million pounds. 
It was later decided that a fair settlement was a million 
pounds.3* James Madison in June of 1801 wrote King saying 
that President Jefferson was not willing to pay more than six 
hundred thousand pounds.35 This was acceptable to the 
British, and on January 8, 1802, a Convention was signed in 
Which the article was set aside and the United States agreed 
to pay Great Britain six hundred thousand pounds, which ended 
the whole dismal affair.3*
The Spoliation Commission, in stark contrast, was much 
more successful/even though each nation had just as much at 
stake as with the debt issue. Reimbursements to American 
merchants had to be paid, so it is only logical that Britain 
attempt to pay as little as it could get away with, just as 
the Americans would try to get the British to pay more. It 
could be supposed that the success of this commission, and 
the failure of the other was because of the personalities 
involved, Lord Grenville certainly believed so.
The Spoliation Commission was composed of two Americans 
and two Britons, with a fifth member who would be mutually 
selected by the first four, just like the Debt Commission.
In London, the American commissioners Christopher Gore and 
William Pinkney and Britons John Nichoii and Nicholas Anstey 
chose the American painter John Trumbull by lot, who had been 
John Jay's secretary during the treaty n e g o t i a t i o n s T h e  
commission first met on October 10, 1796, and concluded its 
business on February 24, 1804.^
There were relatively few difficulties with the London 
Commission. Early on, there was a controversy over the 
jurisdiction of the commission, but by compromising,
Grenville and King were able to work the situation out and 
the commission continued its work .^  Ironically enough, the 
only suspension of the commission was because of the problems 
in Philadelphia. On July 20, 1799, the British members of
the board wrote a letter stating that they could not sit 
while the Americans in Philadelphia refused to follow the 
decisions of the majority of the board.^ It did not meet 
again until the Convention of 1802 was finalized, thereby 
solving the crisis. The board then had little difficulty 
finishing the rest of its business.
When looking at the two commissions, it is cleat that 
they were in very similar situations. In both cases, the 
country that had the opportunity to benefit from the 
proceedings had the majority of the board. Both majorities 
tried to take advantage of their situations, but the London 
Board was much more willing to compromise. Perhaps it is 
because Great Britain had more money, and could afford to 
fellow the majority rulings in London, whereas it the 
Americans followed the rulings of Macdonald, they would be 
bankrupted by claims. The personalities of the participants 
were also factors. Grenville and King ployed active rolesin 
London, attempting to minimize trouble, whereas Liston did 
not play an active role, and Pickering had been encouraging 
Fitzsimon's notions to withdrawal, rather than attempting to 
find a solution to the "majority tyranny” of Macdonald, who 
likewise did not think of compromising on the Dulany or 
Inglis cases.^ In any event, the success of the St. Croix 
and Seizures Commission definitely smoothed relations between 
the two nations, despite the events in Philadelphia.
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?H£ QUASI-ALLIANCE
The good feelings created by the 7ay Treaty had an 
effect on Anglo-American relations during the United States' 
dispute with France from 1797 to 1500. The British 
government was pleased that the two old allies were about to 
come to blows, especially since the conflict would help it in 
its own war effort against France. The British tried to 
prolong the Quasi-War in their favor by offering the American 
government military and ma itime aid, and by cooperating with 
the United States when both governments wanted to wrest Santo 
Domingo from the French.
The British government was very quick to offer military 
aid to the United States because, of the French Crisis. Even 
before the XYZ Affair, Lord Grenville sent Robert Liston the 
following instructions:
* . .If however a rupture should actually take place between 
the Two Countries or should appear highly probable, it is 
the King's Pleasure that you should express His Majestyts 
Willingness to afford a naval Protection to the Commerce 
ot the-United States against the Attacks of the Common 
Enemy.
Later, as news of the XYZ Affair reached the United States 
and Britain in May of 1798, '.Grenville told Liston that the 
sale of Mmshi$s to theUnited States or the loan of British 
seamen to American vessels would certainly he acceptable as
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well as the sale of naval stores and other equipment needed 
to prosecute a naval warJ5 In October, at Pickering’s 
request, Grenville authorized a loan of guns to the United 
States that would be used to defend its coastline.**
The two nations also cooperated at sea. Before the 
United States had built up its navy so it could protect its 
own merchant ships from French warships, it depended 
completely on the British navy for protection in the West 
Indies area. The British obliged, and the cooperation became 
so organized that a system of identification was instituted 
to avoid accidental battles between ships. British convoys 
were also available to American merchants for voyages to and 
from Europe. American shipping was the safest it had been 
during the European war.**
Another area where the United States and Great Britain 
cooperated was in Santo Domingo, Both nations had distinct 
interests there. The British did not want Santo Domingo to 
be able to export its products, especially sugar. British 
West Indian sugar exports had increased greatly because 
Toussaint's revolution h d  brought French export to a 
grinding.halt. Of course, Britain would have opened trade 
there if it could get some of the profit. The American 
government also wanted a cheap source of sugar, and it was 
also very much concerned about the effect that an independent 
black nation would have on its slave population.**
Because their interests were so similar, a mission was 
suggested in both the United States and Great Britain would 
negotiate exclusive trading rights with Toussaint. The 
British representative was Thomas Maitland, who had earned 
Toussaint's respect when he evacuated British forces, 
essentially recognizing the de facto independence of Santo 
Domingo. The American representative was Edward Stevens.
They met with Toussaint and concluded an agreement in late 
spring of 1799. Beginning that summer, British and American 
traders had exclusive rights to trade out of Santo Domingo, a 
testament to the ability of the two nations to work together 
on foreign policy.^
Despite al1 the cooperation and friendship that the 
Prench Crisis created with Britain, it must be pointed out 
that each cooperated in its own best interest. Britain did 
not loan and sell war implements to the United States to 
promote any kind of rapprochement. The British did it 
because a belligerent United States could help their war 
against France. Toussaint was not pro-Brifcish, despite 
Maitland^s earlier withdrawal, and the presence of the 
American Stevens certainly helped to smooth the 
negotiations,^  The American government realized that it was 
in need of assistance if war broke out, and Britain offered 
it. It would be a mistake to view the Quasi~Al1 lance as 
anything but opportunistic by either government. Some
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difficulties between the two countries were not solved, 
precisely because it was not in either nation's interest to 
cooperate or compromise as they had done on other issues.
ETERNAL PROBLEMS: IMPRESSMENT AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS
The issues of impressment and neutral rights were simply 
too important to be solved by the rapprochement. The Jay 
Treaty did not even address impLessment, and it also accepted 
British neutral doctrine and its liberal definition of 
contraband. To be sure, the British attempted to limit their 
seizures of American vessels and impressment practices, but 
both were vital to the British war effort and could not be 
abandoned. These issues would only be solved, ever so 
briefly, in March of 1802, with the signing of the Peace of 
Amiens, and they would continue to plague Anglo-American 
relations until the War of 1812.
Britain made an effort to make the neutral tights 
situation better with the United States after 1795. It 
streamlined its court system, so that cases could be judged 
in a reasonable amount of time, and it would occasionaliy 
remove British commanders who were overzealous in their 
seizures. But Britain refused to negotiate on the principles 
of neutral rights, such as an actual written definition of 
contraband.^ It was understandable. Great Britain simply
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could not allow its enemy to trade and supply its colonies by 
sea and believe that it could win the war. The Americans 
accepted this fact in the Jay Treaty when it acknowledged 
British principles, but it did not solve the problem.
American complaints over seizures, just or unjust, were still 
sent to the government,^ It was a problem that remained
throughout the duration of the Jay Treaty and was a major 
cause of war in 1812, when seizure.*; increased again after 
resumption of war against Napoleon Bonaparte.
Impressment was an even more difficult issue. Britain
continued to impress American sailors throughout the late 
1790s. Britain refused to accept the American definition of 
citizenship, and would impress naturalized Americans who had 
once served in the British navy. The governmerit claimed it 
was too easy to forge citizenship documents, and therefore 
mistakes would be made, and Americans impressed. The only 
attempt the British made at compromise was that they made it
easier for American officials to handle individual cases in 
Britain and British colonial territory.^ Again, they would 
not compromise on principles such as citizenship or the right 
to raid an American ship at sea, They simply could not 
afford to compromise, Compromise on this issue, unlike
trade licenses in the West Indies, would
have hurt the British too much.
This was the state of Anglo-American affairs in 1800.
True, there was cooperation and friendship on some issues; 
but only if it was in each nation's best interest to do so. 
Issues that were so important that, they could not be solved 
during this time were simply left to smolder, ready to flame 
up at any time. In this regard, the Jay Treaty did not 
create a rapprochement, but rather it stabilized the 
relationship, which made it possible for the two nations to 
work together for mutual benefit. And when these beneficial 
situations no longer existed, the same huge problems 
threatened the relationship that had before November 19/
1794.
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FRENCH MISTAKES AND AMERICAN ANGER;
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, 1796-SUMMER OF 1798
After the ratification and funding of the Jay Treaty, 
relations with the French Republic declined considerably.
The French Directory, which became the executive council of 
the republic soon after Washington ratified the treaty, 
wanted to lure the United States back into its sphere of 
influence. It tried to do this by first interfering in the 
El ection of 1796. When this did not work, the Directory 
attempted to bully the United States into giving up its pro- 
British stance through diplomatic coercion, which led to the 
XY2 Affair.
The Directory hoped that by being diplomatically harsh 
to the Aifterican commissioners, the United States would make 
concessions quickly, hoping to avoid conflict with France, 
But whet did not realize was the negative
effect that French interference had cm American public 
opinion toward France, and the extent to which the United 
States wanted to maintain close relations with the British. 
The Directory overestimated the strength and resolve of the 
supposed ’French Party” that would promote French interests 
in the United States against those of its own government.
CHAPTER FOUR
The diplomatic crisis between France and the United States 
took place because French policy-makers did not truly 
understand American foreign policy motivations and goals; as 
well as the fact that no American, regardless of political 
orientation, would accept being bullied and bribed by a 
foreign power.
Fortunately, by July of 1798, as the Directory and the 
French foreign minister, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand- 
P^rigord, began to hear of the incredible reaction against 
France’s diplomatic techniques, they realised that their 
methods were only forcing the United States away, and making 
war very likely. Realizing that the plan was not working, 
Talleyrand began to normalize the situation, and by doing so, 
avoided full-scale waT>;;.-: ;
The Election o f 1796
The Election of 1796 was the United States' first 
pa rlit an elect i on, President Washington had decided not to 
run for another term, so the election pitted John Adams 
against Thomas Jefferson. The election could be viewed 
largely as a test of the Federalist program. The most 
important issue on people's minds was the Jay Treaty. It was 
believed that Jefferson, if elected, would steer the nation 
back toward France, which is why the election became so
important to the French Directory. If France coold help to 
get Jefferson elected, then perhaps the treaty could be 
nullified.
The election was going to be very partisan and divisive, 
regardless of French interference. A cohesive opposition had 
finally coalesced against the policies of the Washington 
administration. The leaders of this group were men such as 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Albert Gallatin. The 
opposition saw how President Washington himself had begun to 
practice politics, and they felt that he had become a member 
of the ''British Party," which wanted to make the United 
Statas the puppet of the British. The Election of 1796, as 
the opposition saw it, would be the only chance to bring the 
United States back on a true course.*
 ^The Federalists were likewise preparing for battle, as 
they did not want to see the radical "French Party" take 
power and lead the United States down the path of 
destruction. But the Federalists had internal problems as 
well. When.theirgreat standard bearer. President 
Washingto two terms had been enough work, the
Federalist Party began to show signs of disunity. Although 
Alexander Hamilton did support Adams for the piesideney 
against Jefferson, he would have preferred Thomas Pinckney as 
the Federalist candidate,v Although the split was minor in 
1796, it grew during the Adams presidency, and it had its
effects on both the crisis with France and the Election of 
1800. But at least in 1796, the Federalists were united in 
their desire to defeat Jefferson.
Into this incredibly tense atmosphere stepped Pierre 
Adet. The French Directory, believing that American public 
opinion was solidly pro-French, decided that the answer to 
their problems with the United States would be to nhelpM the 
American people rid themselves of an administration that did 
not properly represent their views,*' This policy, in 
■reality, was hopelessly naive. The French did not understand 
that the American people would not take kindly to attempts to 
interfere in their political processes, and that the 
activities of Genet and Fauchet had weakened pro-French 
public opinion considerably,
Adet attempted to influence the election in a number of 
different ways. While he travelled around the United States 
campaigning for the Republicans, he implied that a vote for 
Adams was a vote for war.* His diplomatic functions were
suspended relatively early on in the campaign 
campaigned, he said that diplomatic relations
and while he 
would normalise
once Jefferson was elected V He also wrote manifestoes
decrying the effect that the election of Adams would have on 
Franco-American relations. The Directory in Faris tried to 
help the cause by decreeing that all neutral shipping would 
be treated  by France as it was treated by Great Britain,
believing incorrectly that the merchant class would blame 
their government for the decrees and hot .fhe'Trench;4'--'
But all the campaigning, decrees, and threats did not 
work. In fact. they backfired.' American opinion of France 
dropped during 1796 because of Adet's interference and the 
commercial decrees. American public opinion was still pro- 
French at the beginning of 1796, bn* because of Adet, it 
became' decided! y. anti -French.' Jef f et son lost t he el ect i on , 
in all likelihood, because of Adet's actions. The 
Federalists used Adet's actions to prove that the Republicans 
were simplv French pawns, and that a vote for the Federalist 
Party would be a vote for an independent government. Many 
people voted for the Federalists because of Adet’s actions, 
although they knew that it possibly meant war. It was better 
than being a puppet of the French government. The election 
cf Adams to the presidency hur t Fr anco • Amer ican re1 at i ons 
even more.
Beginning of the XYZ Affair
The stage for the XYZ Affair was actual 1y set before the 
election of Adams in 1797. The situation began because of 
Monroe’s recall in 1796. It was this act ion which all owed 
the Directory to refuse the man sent to replace Monroe, 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a relatively moderate
Federalist, It was this refusal, along with the suspension 
ofAdet in the United States with no replacement forthcoming, 
that induced President Adams to send a commission to France 
to negotiate with the Directory. It was this group who met 
the infamous X, Y. and Z.
James Monroe was recalled from his post for a very basic 
reason: he was not supporting administration policy. In 
letters tot he minister of exterior affairs, Charles de la 
Croix, he definitely did not defend the Jay Treaty and other 
American actions as well as he could have,: He and Pickering
quarrelled in the latter part of 1796. In June, Pickering 
accused Monroe of not doing his best to defuse the problems 
that the ratification of the Jay Treaty would cause with the 
Directory.^ In September, Monroe answered back that he had 
been keeping the Department of State apprized of the effect 
that the treaty was having in France, and nothing was done in 
the State Department to cot reef the Fr ench impressions of the 
treaty. He also defended himself on the grounds that he had 
done the best he could to "promote harmony between the two 
republics."*' The argument was moot, however, because before 
Monroe even wrote his reply, Picketing had sent Monroe’s 
recall. In July of 1796, Hamilton suggested to the president 
that it would be best to recall Monroe, as he was doing too 
much harm. He endorsed C.C. Pinckney as Monroe’s 
replacement, believing that he would be acceptable to the
Directory* as he was not against the French Revolution. ** 
faking this advice, Washington asked Pinckney to assume the 
position on July 19, Pinckney accepted on July 27 and 
Pickering wrote Monroe, informing him of his recall on August 
22 , 1796.12
The effect of Monroe’s recall was disastrous. The 
Directory was convinced that Washington was clearly partisan, 
as he recalled one of the very few in his administration who 
shared and understood France’s interests. The Directory gave 
Monroe a heartfelt send-off . 11 Also the Directory at about 
the same time, decided to suspend the position of French 
minister. They relieved Adel, and appointed no one to take 
his place. He was to remain in the United States to campaign 
for the interests of France and to use his dismissal against 
the Federal ists , **
The crisis then reached critical proportions when de la 
Croix refused to accept Pinckney as minister until France had 
been treated just 1 y by the Uni ted '-Slat es , Pinckney was 
ordered to leave France in late January, when he withdrew to 
Holland. Then in March, the Directory issued another 
maritime decree which abandoned the free ships, free goods 
principle. This decree allowed the seizure of American 
ships, in direct violation of the Treaties of 177S•^
The effect on the United States was tremendous; Many 
Federalists called for war. Republicans, of course, wanted
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negotiation and discussion with France. But in general, 
France’s actions and the March decree set off a new wave of 
anti-freneh sentiment. Adams' Cabinet, which was carried 
over from President Washington's, went to Alexander Hamilton 
for advice.** Hamilton replied that the United States should 
send a mission to negotiate with France, but that the country 
should also be preparing for war* The Cabinet, taking 
Hamilton's advice to heart, counseled the president to pursue 
peace, but prepare for war. Adams then called for special 
session of Congress to meet on May L5 to discuss American 
policy toward Prance.
The XYZ Affair
Adams himself wanted peace, but like most Americans, he 
was not willing to sacrifice American honor. At the special 
session of Congress, which met on May 16; 1797, Adams was 
belligerent. Although he said he would attempt negotiation 
se«in by sending a commission to France, he spent much of the 
address discussing the need to increase the defense of the
United States, both on the land and on the sea, especially in
ISthe face of the illegal depredations on American commerce. 
Although he did not want war, Adams was definitely prepared 
for it.
In April, the president had asked his Cabinet for advice
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on certain issuer concerning France. The Cabinet immediately 
sent the questions to Hamilton, who answered them. He said 
that France would probably accept an extraordinary mission, 
and that it should be sent, as the United States had nothing 
to gain from war. He suggested that the United States should 
offer equal treatment to the French government in any area 
that it felt Great Britain enjoyed advantage.
So with the whole Cabinet united on the concept of 
negotiation with defense, they discussed the membership of 
the mission. There was disagreement. Adams had at one time 
hoped that he could convince Thomas Jefferson to accept a 
position, making the commission bi-partisan, but the Vice- 
President declined the offer. Adams still wanted a moderate 
nominated to appease the Republicans. The rest of his 
Cabinet however, wanted the commission to be completely 
Federalist, even though Hami1 ton had advocated offering a 
position to either Jefferson or James Had is on. ■:-Adams;-- 
compromised, nominating Francis Dana over his .friend El bridge 
Gerry to join John Marshall and Charles Pinckney in France. 
These names were confirmed by the Senate in early June. ^
Dana, however, was ill and had other personal concerns, and 
there! ore declined to serve. Adams then offered the post to 
Gerry without discussing the matter with his cabinet,'*
Gerry accepted, and he was confirmed by the Senate. This 
action relieved Republicans, and made Federalists doubtful of
Adams' party loyalty, It also opened a schism between Adams 
and the Hamiltonians that would become a huge problem for the 
Federalists at the end of the crisis and in the Election of 
1800.”
All the commissioners had arrived in Paris by October of 
1797. There had been a coup in July which led to the 
dismissal of some of the Directors and brought Talleyrand to 
the foreign office. The commissioners called on Talleyrand 
as soon as Gerry arrived in Paris, and Talleyrand told them 
that their official recognition would take place as soon as a 
report on Franco-American relations had been submitted to the 
Directory. The commissioners, however, were never officially 
recognized.^
A few days after meeting with Talleyrand, problems 
began. Pinckney was informed that the Directory objected to 
some aspects of Adams' speech of May 16, and that his actions 
would have to be explained. Later, on October 18, a man 
named Jean Hottinguer, who was referred to as Mr. X in the 
dispatches submitted to Congress, visited Pinckney.
Hottinguer told Pinckney the price of negotiation would be 
the following: an explanation of Adams' speech would have to 
be given, a bribe would have to be paid, and as a loan would 
have to be made. Pinckney asked for the terms of negotiation 
in writing, which were given to the envoys on October 20. 
Hottinguer and another man named Pierre Bellamy, referred to
- 7 3;
as Mr. f, gave the commission the terms. First, Adams* 
speech would have to be explained. Second, the Directory 
demanded that the United States government pay the 
reparations due to American citizens because of the March 
1797 decree. Third, the Treaties of 1778 would have to be 
renewed, with France being given the same rights that were 
given to the British. Fourth, a loan would have to be given 
to the French Republic, as well as a bribe. Th e Americans 
answered back that they did not have the authority to grant 
France a loan, that they only had the p o w e r  to negotiate a 
treaty.**
The days after that were similar. Talleyrand’s agents 
attempted to convince the envoys that they did have the power 
to make a loan, if they so chose. They also met a third man, 
Lucien Hauteva1 , who was Mr. Z . It was a difficu1 1  time, 
because neither side was budging, and it appeared that no one 
would. The ministers were not recognized,and they would not 
be until they gave in to Talleyrand's demands. The French 
agents also tried to impress the consequences of failure on 
the Americans. But they would not give in . " 5
The envoys then tried other ways to gain recognition.
On November 1, the Americans decided that they would no 
longer communicate with unofficial representatives of France. 
Talleyrand still refused to recognize them. Then on November 
11> they wrote a letter to Talleyrand officially asking for
recognition. That again did not help, as he did not even 
reply. it seems to the Americans that the mission was going 
to fail. The mission stagnated until January.
During the time in which the Americans refused to grant 
a loan and negotiations were at a standstill; Talleyrand went 
about dividing the envoys. He found that Gerry was much more 
receptive to compromise than were Marshall or Pinckney. So 
he began to have private meetings with Gerry, in which he 
tried to convince him of the French position. Meanwhile, 
Marshall and Pinckney were becoming increasingly discouraged 
and started to think about returning to the United States.
In January, Marshall began preparing a memorial that would 
clearly state the American position and their willingness to 
negotiate with the French. If they could not negotiate, they 
wanted to leave France, It was difficult for Marshal 1 and 
Pinckney to convihce Gerry to sign the memorial, but he did 
and it was sent to Talleyrand on January $1,^
In February, some progress was made. Gerry continued to 
meet privately with Talleyrand, and in doing so, he told 
Gerry that the most important issue was the loan, and no new 
treaty could be negotiated without it, Talleyrand 
Surrendered on the other demands such as the explanation of 
the May 16 speech and the bribe. Talleyrand, in discussions 
with the Directory, also decided to stop seizing American 
ships in April
Talleyrand did a very good job of convincing Gerry that 
if the loan was not made there would be war. The envoys 
split on the loan issue, with Marshall and Gerry disagreeing 
over the possibility of war. At that time, Talleyrand 
decidedthat he would negotiate only with Gerry, and 
endeavored to force Marshal 1 and Pinckney out of Prance,
This was accomplished in March, after Talleyrand had replied 
to the American memorial of January, For Marshall and 
Pinckney, the situation had not improved as the loan was 
still required, so they asked for their passports.
Talleyrand-granted - them happily, but he also convinced Gerry 
that if he left there would be war between the two nations 
so he derided to stay in Fiance to keep the peace. Pinckney 
and Marshall gave up the mission in late April. '
The failure of the mission rested clearly on 
Talleyrand's shoulders. He thought that by threatening war, 
he could force the United States into a favorable settlement 
for Prance. But he did not fundamentally understand that the 
Americans could not accept his form of diplomacy, and he let 
his game carry on much too far. He also did not realise that 
the American public would react as angrily as they did when 
they heard how their commissioners had been treated, He 
thought that the french partisans in the United States would 
be able to stop any American ideas of war. What he did not 
realise was that many of those French partisans began to call
for war also. They were loyal to the United States, not to
The Effect of the XY2Affair in the Uni ted States
The effect of the Tit dispatches on the United States 
was very great. The affair clearly demonstrated to the 
American people that France did not care at all about peace 
or the alliance with the United States. Even some 
Republicans, o n c e  they had s e e n  the dispatches, were forced 
to admit that war was the only alternative. The affair 
created a frenzy during the summer of 1798, which has 
sometimes been referred to as the "Black Cockade Fever," Any 
American who sided with France was considered a traitor, and 
there was no effective opposition to Federalist war and 
defense measures. The only barrier; ironical 1y / was the 
president himself, who refused to declare unlimited war. It 
was Adams' doctrine of maintaining peace that split the 
Federalist Party between the moderates and High Federalists; 
which allowed the Republicans to rebound after 1798.
The first dispatches from the envoys were received by 
Pickering on March 4, 1798. President Adams decided that 
some of the uncoded dispatches were very important and should 
be immediately communicated to Congress, and he did so on 
March 5. As the rest of the dispatches were decoded, Adams
realised that the mission was a failure and that war might b#
necessary t" muntain na* :ena 1 honor. On March 13, he wrote 
a letter to the Cabinet in which he asked two quest ions: 1) 
should he present the dispatches to Congress, and 2) should 
war be declared,'3 His Cabinet advi ed against war, but an 
Increase in preparation, Adams actually wanted to jo to war 
very much, and he wrote a war message,. but. t hen he realized 
that in' order to get a war declaration he would have to 
submit the dispatcher, whi h would endancpu the *•, -.^ •yr , so he 
scrapped the message. He felt that the United States, for 
the sake of c jmm e i ce , a 1 ■so. had ' t o f i ght' a g a i no t ihe :,■ 3 anua r.y. "
decree whi.eh followed the "ienemy goods, enemy chip" doctrine,
He decider1 to wait f 03r the ia,lT|»*l i f:an people to rise up agains t
French insults, thereby giving him the declaration he 
want ed . 50
■.On March 19, he sent a message to Congress s.t at. ingoi/hat 
he considered the mission over and declared limited 
hostilities against France, Four days later, Pickering wrote 
to the commissioners, officially closing the mission and 
ordering them tr return to the United States. Needless to 
say, the Republicans were dismayed at the president’s actions 
and they wanted more proof of the failure of the mission 
before they would pass any war measures. This was exactly 
what Adams wanted, an excuse to disclose the dispatches. .He 
knew that disclosure would ruin the French cause in America.
After strong debate, the House passed a resolution demanding 
the president submit all the dispatches, without deletions*
The Republicans' had been tricked. Once they ‘aw what 
was in the dispatches, they knew that war was unavoidable if 
the dispatches were published for the general public. The 
House Republicans fried to stop a publication resolution, but
on April 6, it passed. The real crisis for the Republicans
■ ■ vn ■was just beginning. ‘
Tic* Federalists acted quickly to take advantage of the 
situation the publication of the dispatches put them in. 
Although some Republicans 1ike Jefferson believed that the 
United States would only have to apologize for the Hay 16 
speech to make settlement possible, many Republicans began to 
support the war measures. Public opinion also changed 
rapidly as well ,''WiiK many pro-French people reacting angrily 
to French disrespect .
Federalists in Congress began to propose defense bills 
in earnest. Hamilton, although not suggesting total war, did 
advocate the arming of merchant vessels, the creation of a 
navy large enough to "cruise our coast and serve as convoys 
to our trade," and the suspension of the Treaties of 1778. 
Most Federalists generally agreed with these programs.
Adams began war preparation by creating a Department of 
the Navy in April, appointing Benjamin Stoddard to head the 
department. The Congress also authorized the building of
twelve warships.** Congress then allowed for an increase in 
the size of the regular army. In July, Adams ordered James 
McHenry, the Secretary of War, to visit Washington with the 
purpose of asking him to become Commander-in-Chief. He also 
told McHenry to ask Washington for his thoughts on who should 
le a d ;;.th jie ;a r^ :^ .- ;J '-
■■■■■The Hepubl i cans were able to stop a measure that would 
annul the treaties with France. Because there was no word
whet her the miss i on had 1 1  u 1 y failed, Federali st s we u? not 
able to convince enough members of Congress to pass the bill. 
They were, however, able to pass an embargo on French goods, 
and the Congress also prohibited French ships from entering 
American ports.
Federalists also began to attack Republicans;
Republican newspapers, such as the Aurora, wrote that a war 
was not worth all the trouble and expense if an apology was 
all that was needed. For such views, the editor of the 
paper; Benjamin Franklin Bache was personally assaulted, and 
Federalists also attacked his home. Federalists also began 
wearing a black cockade similar to the ones that were worn by 
revolutionary soldiers, and fights soon started between the 
wearers of the black cockade with those who dared to continue 
to wear the French tricolor.*®
In spite of all that was happening in the United States, 
Adams did not declare war. He kept looking for some hope for
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peace. He found it in the return of John Marshall. AlthoUfb 
Marshall was greeted as a hero who defied the French in
Paris, and he played the role in public, privately he told 
the president that the Directory did not want war. rfe 
believed that France was simply using the threat of war as 
diplomacy.^
Problems then began to brew within the Federalist Party 
over the war measures. Adams did not believe that the 
strengthening of the army should be the main goal of the war 
measures. He felt that if a war would be fought, it would
probably be at sea. The Hamiltonian Federalists, however, 
were much more concerned with the building of the army, as 
they were much more worried about a possible French invasion 
But there were also personal reasons for Adams* decisions.
He knew that Washington would most probably come out of 
retirement to lead the army, but he did not want to put 
Hamilton in a position of power. Washington accepted Adams’ 
offer on the condition that he could appoint his own staff. 
His choice for second -in-command was Hamilton, and Adams 
certainly did not want to contribute in any way to Hamilton’s 
success and glory. But his Cabinet, being Hamiltonian, 
supported the appointment of Hamilton, which only increased
the bad feelings within the administration. *0
The war preparation continued into the summer of 1798.
High Federalists continued to call for war while Adams
remained undecided. The Alien and Sedition Acts had been 
passed, and the Navy was strengthened even further. In
Adams finally abrogated the treaties with France. Adams 
tired of Gerry's informal negotiations, so Pickering finally 
ordered him home in late June. A tax was passed on property 
«*nd slaves that would haunt the Federalists later as the 
^edibility of war lessened/ In spite of all the war 
preparation, peace was in the offing. Through.Marshall and 
other sources, Adams began to become convinced that the 
French did not want war.
■ '/ ■/ 
-
;Tal ley^ an4*?....Reaction
In May, Talleyrand received word of the American 
reaction to the XY.Z dispatches. It became clear to him that 
his peculiar version of diplomacy was not working. The 
United States was not intimidated, but emboldened. He 
irrenediately took steps to avoid full war. He first tried to 
pretend that he was ignorant of any bribery attempts or 
unofficial negotiators. When this did not work, he informed 
Adams very indirectly that he was interested in peace.
Adams, whose enthusiasm for war was waning in the face of 
Federalist infighting, took the offers seriously.
Talleyrand tried to impress upon Gerry the fact that he 
did not want war while Gerry was still in Paris. But Gerry
had received his orders from Pickering, and desperately 
wanted to leave Paris. Talleyrand hoped that Gerry would
request the power to treat from Adams, so war could be 
averted, Talleyrand even gave up al1 of the original 
demands, and promised to stop the depredations on American 
shipping. Despite the progress, Gerry left Paris for the 
United States in late July.**
I l l
Talleyrand did not rely completely on Gerry for success. 
He also decided to send a man named Louis Pichon to The Hague 
to meet informally with William Vans Hurray, who was the 
American minister to Holland. Murray was important, because
he was a close friend of John Quincy Adams, who watched 
events in Europe for his father. This was a relatively easy 
way for Talleyrand to get his message to Adams without 
embarrassing France ...excessively,—  /.
Pichon began talking with Murray in June, Talleyrand’s 
plan worked. Murray began to write to J.Q. Adams almost 
immediately, professing that Prance did not want war.
Murray, playing along well, asked the Dutch government to 
convince the Directory to offer President Adams the 
assurances that he had asked for in his June 21 address, that 
he wanted a guarantee that any minister sent to Prance would 
be accepted properly. After receiving a number of letters 
from Talleyrand through Pichon professing a desire for peace, 
in October Murray finally received the direct assurances that
he had asked for. He immediately forwarded this letter to 
Adams, and peace was at hand.^
Talleyrand and the Directory were the linchpins of the 
crisis. They did not want war, but they devised the policies
of b r i be r y , 1 oans , and s ei zu res whi c-h made Amer i c a ns very 
angry.The Americans felt that their national honor was at 
stake. It is clear that neither Ta11eyrand nor the Directory 
had any cleat understanding of American public opinion. 
Americans, even those in the "French Party,** were pro 
American, not pro-French, Republicans after April of 1798 
did not oppose war on principle. They, like the Federalists, 
felt that the French were in the wrong. They simply felt 
that peace could have solved the problem with less cost.
Once Talleyrand realized the true nature of American resolve, 
he immediately removed all conditions that stood in the way
of negotiations. After all, France, like Great Britain, was 
already in a war and it could not afford another, Talleyrand 
took a risk with the United States, and lost badly.
CHAPTER FIVE
AN HONORABLE PEACE:
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, SUMMER OF 1798-1800
lljl
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As 1798 wore on, Talleyrand continued his peace efforts. 
The decrees against American shipping were lifted, and his 
guarantees to Adams that a minister would be acrepted 
proper!y beeame more oflicia!. Convinced that peace was at 
hand, Adams decided to normalise relations with franc**. He 
nominated William Vans Murray as minister to fiance, and set 
up a second commission which was chained with resolving the 
conflict. While this commission did eventually produce the 
Convention of 1800 and ended the naval warfare that had begun 
in 1799, Adams’ interest in peace also had effects on the
nation and the federal 1st'-'Party .
High federalists were. disappointed .with Adams* peace . 
initiatives. They wci e. mw *h more * n ?d with the'
possibility of invasi on f rom Id mee ai 1 I »»r«; t pr:t n. f t 
Talleyrand. Adams did not lose his interest in war only 
because of Talleyrand’s >ve tines. He also did not want In 
give Hamilton or his Cabinet any more prwet or responsibility 
than he had to. He wanted the Fede; a list Party t° be his 
not Hamilton’s, So he sent the peace commission despite the 
objections of his Cabinet and later dismissed Pickering,
Peace was attained, butothe High Federalists never torgave 
his actions, and actively campaigned for his defeat in 1800. 
This allowed for the Republican Party, which took advantage
of t he co\unri ^ , >, x n ways the - Federal i st Party could not , 
to rehabilitate r and take the Elect ion of 1800.
Inform* ’ ■‘'alls for Pe-V'e Continue
Tallo- iind. o^ut inu.ed hi s Mn cgot i at 1 ons M wi t h Murray 
through Pi chon thi ■.•ugh the t ©rt of 1?9h H* continued to 
assure Hurray that any minister would be accepted proper 1y, 
and he also .professed in August of 17 98 that, he did not see 
’*any clashing of interests, any f"t«s©o of )eal.usy ,n Fichon 
romwiM .-at o,l these f *m-1 i ng..- to. M m  t -iy, an 1 Mu* t ay then wrote 
Adams. The DMecfuiy had derided tp cane* I the decrees 
against Affimicau shipping which removed one of the biggest 
complaints against the French government ,1 it lifted the 
embargo on Am* \ i mi ships -a * »*w l a f
George began who went on i personal p* act* mi f uinn to 
France, also ’out t lbuted to Adams * hel ief  ^hat war was 
unnecessary When he arrived in France, the Directors 
treated him vet y well, and th?y openly discussed issues with 
him, He was told that France desired nothing but peace with 
the United States, and that France would soon halt any 
actions that were hurting the United States, He was also
told that the Dilatory hoped that the government in the 
United States would be replaced by Jefferson, but that they 
would do nothiT.c 4 interfere with the American political 
process. The French had learned at last, tLa* internal 
interference in another nation's elections often did more 
harm than good and they were not going to do it again.^
Logan’s stay in France was short; he arrived hack in the 
United States in November with his message of peace. Adams 
met with Logan in late November, and he exp?lined to Adans 
that the Directory would accept any man that the president 
saw f i i . El bt idge Oei t y also ar r i ved in the Una t ed States at. 
at .'lit the same time, and he essentially told Adams the same 
story. The French wanted peace, and t he y we re willing t o 
follow Adams' terms.
then in October, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Hurray received absolute positive assurances ftorn Tal 1 eyrand 
that a minister would be accepted as a repiestniativ§.of■t ;
" f i ee . i ndependent f and power f u 1 ■hat.i on , Adams received 
thi. news from Hurray in February of 1799, Once he received 
such an unequivocal message, Adams decided that a new mission 
should be sent. He nominated Murray as minister to France on 
February 18, 1799.* High Federalists like Hamilton and 
Pickering were displeased, as they were not convinced of 
Talleyrand's sincerity. Pickering himself felt that Adams 
should not be influenced by what he saw as Gerry's
inconsistent opinions of French attitudes; opinions did not 
prove sincerity in such an important matter. hi though 
Pickering had expressed his concerns to Adams a few days 
before the arrival of Talleyrand's letter in early February, 
High Federalist opinion of Talleyrand's motives remained the 
same after the arrival of this letter.8 High Federalist 
members of the Senate attempted to block the nomination of 
Murray. In discussions with an ad hoc High Federalist Senat* 
committee* Adams told them that if the nomination was 
rejected, he would then appoint a commission. The High 
Federalists then decided to reject the nomination. In its 
place* Adams nominated Murray, Oliver Ellsworth, and Patrick 
Henry to the commission.8 Henry, who had been extremely sick 
in the months preceding his appointment,. 'declined the 
nomination. Adams then nominated William Davie to fill the 
position,15
Talleyrand's peace initiatives divided the United
States. The Republicans saw them as proof that France was 
still the friend of the United States, and that the war 
measures and Alten and ftedi tion Acts were unnecessary * The 
American people also began to tire o* the half war, half 
peace condition that the United States was in, and they 
started to demand changes in policy, especially in the area 
of taxes. Adams' decision to send a mission to France
shocked many Federalists, Adams had to fight with his
Cabinet and Alexander Hamilton to get the mission under way*
the Republicans were overjoyed by the reports of Gerry, 
Hurray, and Logan when they arrived in the United States, 
the reports, in their eyes, showed that Prance had never 
wanted war, and that the Federalists had been exaggerating 
the potential danger to the United Stater Jefferson, in 
fact, saw the XYZ Affair as a lfdish cooked up by Marshall . " 11 
the Republicans began t« attack the Federalist program with 
renewed ..vigor, as Federalist support waned, in 1798. Jefferson 
and Hadison wrote the Kentucky and Virginia R*e;olut ions 
attacking the Alien and Sedition Acts. and Federalist 
measures began to stall -In Congress. The Republicans were 
able to take advantage of the public outcry against, taxes and 
the Allen and Sediti on Acts, and in t hei r opposi ti on to the 
unnecessary Federalist program, they were able to regain much 
of the support they had lost after the publication of the XYZ 
Dispatches.^
The. American;publiccs resolve against France began to 
decay in the Fall of 1798, Americans were expecting a 
declaration of war immediately after the disclosure of the 
XYZ dispatches. The crisis wore on into the Fall, and then 
reports started coming in that France wanted peace on 
America's terms. To the ordinary eitisen, this was enough to 
satisfy American honor* He was no longer interested in 
Federalist war preparation, and he especially disliked having
to pay a direct tax to finance a war that, to mind, was 
never going to happen.^ Many people also began to protest 
against the Alien and Sedition Acts as well,**
The most vivid example of public outcry against 
Federalist policy was Fries* Rebellion. In early March, 
Germans in the Pmnsylvania counties of Northampton, Bucks, 
*nd Montgomery began to rebel against the property tax that 
had been passed in July. A number of armed men on March 7 
rode to the jail in. Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, people who
had demonstrated" the day before against the tax were being 
held-.'.The marshal i of the town was frightened by the show of
. * t-force, and released the-'demonstrators . President Adams 
issued a proclamation condemning the action, and ordered the 
militia in Pennsylvania to maintain the peace and insure the 
collection of the tax. The militia was able to quickly 
capture John Fries and the other leaders of the rebellion.
On May 9, Fries was convicted of treason and sentenced to be 
hanged.^
Federalists like Pickering tried to use the rebellion to 
undercut the peace talks, saying that the rebels were 
influenced by the French government, Adams, who was firmly 
committed to peace by May disagreed, and began to consider 
whether Fries had actually committed treason against the 
tlnited States. In May of 1000, just before Fries* sentence 
was to be carried out, he wrote his Cabinet asking for their
opinion on the nature of Pries' crimed They replied that 
Pries had indeed committed treason and the sentence should be 
carried out, although Charles Lee and Benjamin Stoddard felt 
that only the hanging of Fries was sufficient for public 
demonstration and the other convicts could be shown mercy.
But both of those men would Have rather seen the execution of 
all the convicts, rather than the pardon of all three.** 
Despite the opinions of hir. Cabinet, Adams decided on Hay 21 
tc pardon all three men, and all the other participants in
■ ■ ■ ■ i ^the rebel lion.*
The pardor of Fries and the other rebels had a divisive 
effect on the Federalist Party, but the party had been split 
ever since Adams first nominated Hurray as minister to France 
m  February of 1799. After the war measures first passed 
Congress and Washington was appointed Commander-in-chief, 
with Hamilton as Inspector General despite Adams' objections, 
Hamilton put forth all his efforts to raise and organise the 
army. Although Hamilton supported the sending of the first 
mission to France, he was definitely focused on the 
possibility of war after the Summer of 1798. Almost all his 
letters after his appointment had something to do with the 
army. It was his job to report to the Secretary of War and 
Adams during this period, and he did so on a regular and 
frequent basis. It is very difficult to gauge Hamilton's 
opinions on the peace commission because of his focus on the
army. Later writings indicate that he felt that the United 
States had veiy little to gain from war.**
High Fedora lists, for the most part, simply assumed that 
Talleyrand was tricking Hurray and others and that there 
would eventually be war. This created problems as the 
American public began to favor peace once again. The High 
federalists had no. "pro gram except war. A. peace overtures 
continued and people accepted them the Federalists'continued 
to push for war measures, despite the fact that they were 
becoming unpopular. To be sure, the Moderate Federalists who 
supported Adams did favor the peace mission, but the High 
Federalists lost much of the popularity that they had gained 
during the Summer of 1798. The High Federalists’ inability 
to adjust to the peace initiatives, regardless of their 
validity, caused the Federalist Party to split and to lose 
popularity among the people.
The Quasi-War
Ironical 1y enough, actual hosti1ities between American 
warships and French warships did not begin until Talleyrand’s 
peace overtures were on their way to the United States. 
Warfare between the two nations was limited in nature. Thera 
were no invasions m o  armies clashed. There were a number of 
naval engagements: first, between armed privateers and French
vessels# and later between the American Navy and French 
ships. The newly built American Navy had a very good showing 
in the limited action that it saw betwee. the middle of 1700 
and 1800*
Some of the American success in the Quasi-War has to be 
credited to the British, The British Navy had previously 
fought with the French Navy and armed privateers, thereby 
removing much of France’s naval capability :n the western 
hemisphere Also, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
Americans and British did form a Quasi-AlI lance in which the 
two navies worked together against the French in the 
Caribbean area. Much of the protection that American 
merchants needed to ship their goods was provided by British 
convoys, making the job of the American Navy much easier than 
it could have been.
This is not to take away from the rather spectacular 
victories that American warships achieved against the French. 
Victories by the Const#!iation and the Constitution over 
TJ Insurgent# and ha Vengeance earned the respect of the 
European powers and allowed xhe United States to regain its 
national honor. Captain Thomas Truston of the Const el}at ion 
became a national hero through his deeds during the Quasi- 
War. By early 1789# the increased insurance rates that 
shippers had to pay because of increased French depredations 
had once again been reduced to pre-war levels because of the
activities of the American Navy. The American Navy had much 
to be proud of .2*
The Sending of the Commission
President Adams had difficulty sending the commission to 
Paris. Although public, Republican, and Moderate Federalist 
opinion a 1 1  favored the sending of t he commissi on, Adams had 
prol* 1ems with the High Fed«ra1i st membet s of his own Cabin. et. 
Although High Federalists tried throughout 1799 to block the 
commissi on , Adams "as convinced that hi s peace pol icy was 
correct, and he went ahead of it despite the objections of 
Pickering, Wolcott , and McHenry , which .deepened the split 
between the Hamiltonians and the Moderates even further.
As has been mentioned before, Timothy Pickering was 
greatly dismayed at President Adams * nomination of Murray.
He felt that Talleyrand had done a masterful 3 0 b of fooling 
Oerry, Logan, and Murray, and that the policies of the French 
government had not really changed. Alexander Hamilton 
expressed concern that a resolution to the problems with 
France would lead to war with ..Britain.22 High Federalists 
were also concerned about the stability of the French 
government, which had suffered a purge in June. This coup 
temporarily removed Talleyrand from the foreign off ice. 
Concerns such as these led them to try to stop the peace
mission. Tbs High federalist Cabinet members were glad to 
find in March of 1790 that Adams wanted to demand harsh terms 
from the French. First, Adams wanted the French to pay for
all spoliations, second, he did not want ships to have to 
carry a rdle d*equipage/ and third. Adams wanted to remove 
the United States guarantee of the French West Indies. 
Pickering believed that these terms would be too harsh and 
the mission would fail
■■■Pickering also attempted to stop the mission on the 
basis that the American government had never received actual 
official assurances that a minister would be accepted 
properly. He sent a letter to Murray in March ordering him 
to inform Talleyrand that ministers had been appointed to 
negotiate in Paris, but that they would not be sent until the 
American government obtained absolute assurances that the 
ministers would be received directly and unequivocal 1 y by the 
Directory according to the law of nations.^ Talleyrand 
responded to Murray's request on May 12, giving these 
officia1 assurances. These assurances reached Adams in 
early August, which renewed Adams' resolve to find a peaceful 
Solution,. ■.
After this defeat, the High Federalists used the news of 
the French coup of aune as a reason for suspending the 
mission. But Adams wanted to send the mission, so on the 
suggestion of Charles Lee and Benjamin Stoddard, who
supported the mission. Adams travelled from Massachusetts to 
Trenton to discuss the commission with his Cabinet.** Me 
arrived on October 10, where he met with his Cabinet and 
Alexander Hamilton, who ha .1 also travelled to Trenton to 
discuss the issue with the president and the Cabinet. The 
High Fedet a 1i sts argued that the mission should not be sent 
as the French tovernmeni wa$ not stable and that it might 
endanger the relationship with Great Britain* The president 
answered back that he believed the peace overtures to be 
genuine. Hamilton even tried to convince the president to 
give up the mission, but his decision was made." On October 
16, he wrote a note to Pickering asking him to deliver the 
commissions of Ellsworth and Davie and to inform them that 
they were to leave the United States before November 1. He 
did not consult his Cabinet on the final decision, which 
convinced the High Federalists on his Cabinet that he could 
no longer be trusted. This would have its effects later 
during the Election of 1800.
The Pence Negotiations and the Convention
ZliBworth and William Davie arrived in Lisbon on 
November 27. Upon arriving the mission ran into potential 
problems, because Napoleon Bonaparte had overthrown the 
Directory in early November, and their credentials were made
out to the Directory, Boi,apart e, however, wanted peace and 
he indicated that he would accept the ministers as planned. 
The two Americans then travelled from Lisbon to Paris, where 
they met Murray on March 2, 1800.^
After their arrival, Talleyrand wrote the Americans a 
letter in which he informed them that Joseph Bonaparte, 
Bonaparte*s brother. Pierre Roederer, and Charles Fleurieu 
had been named to negotiate with them. He also informed them 
that they would met with Bonaparte* on March 7. The 
negotiators exchanged credentials on April 7. in the home of 
Joseph ..Bonaparte.**
The instructions that Adams gave to the envoys were 
firm, The most important objective for the Americans was 
French-compensation-for.its illegal seizures. The resolution 
of this issue was a sine qua non to further negotiations.
The Americans were not to guarantee any French territory in a 
new treaty, and they were not to give a loan to the French 
government. There was to be no carry-over of obligation from 
the old treaties; only the conditions of the new treaty would 
be binding. Essentially, the Americans wanted to kill the 
fraiico-American alliance and seek compensation for the 
seizures
The instructions for the French ministers were basicy 
Bonaparte wanted to embrace liberal neutral trade prineipiesy 
as France desperately needed the neutral carrying trade. The
French negot lators W.ere a 1 * r i d to revive the old t reati es
and gain the same rights as the British were given in Jay’s 
Treaty, They were told that: these issues had to resolved 
before damages would be .-discussed. ^
The instructions were incompatible in essence, The 
Americana wanted to discuss damages first . the f t ench would 
not discuss them until the other issues were res«Ived. The 
Americans were told to conclude a new treaty, the French were 
instructed to revive the old ones. These issues caused 'the 
most trouble throughout the negotiations,
The Americans began the negotiations in Apri1 by raising 
the issue of compensation. They suggested that claims should 
be decided by a board, similar to the boards that were set up 
in the Jay Treaty. The French replied that they recognised 
the existence of ihe claims hut that they depended on the 
status of the old treaties. Therefore, the treaty issue 
would have to be concluded before the claims issue could be 
discussed. This contradicted the Americans1 instructions to 
the letter. Essentially, the Americans would have to 
recognise the Treaties of "17 7-ft before damages would be 
discussed They were ordered not to do this.^
The problem for the Americans was that the claims that 
they made were defined only within parameters of the treaties 
they wanted to cancel. They could not claim that the United 
States and France were in a state of w»:, as that would
release the French from any obligations under the treaties. 
The French seizures were illegal because they broke the 
principle of •'free ships, free goods** that was outlined in 
the Treaties of 1778. which the Americans wanted to cancel.
If the treaties were canceled then the principles in them 
could not be used,
This problem caused the negotiations to stall by the end 
of Hay. The parties simply did not have a common ground from 
which to negotiate. The impasse continued until July, when 
the French ministers offered to renounce the old treaties, 
but they also refused to pay the indemnities. They also 
demanded equal treatment in the new treaty. The Americans 
realized that this might have been the best that they could 
do under the circumstances, Bonapar** ’s leadership had 
strengthened France, and negotiations were under way to end 
hostilities in Europe. As previously discussed, America's 
Svccess in the Quasi-War was in large part caused by 
cooperating with the British against the French, The United 
States would obviously be in great danger if it were forced 
to face French forces without allies. The envoys decided to 
break with their instructions,3*
Bonaparte had his own reasons for wanting to conclude 
matters with the United States. After he defeated Austria in 
Europe, his main concern became Great Britain. He devised a 
plan in which he could isolate Britain. He wanted to do this
by the league of armed neutrality, and by
coaxing Russia to abandon the Second Coalition by offering 
Malta to the Tsar. He wanted to include the United Staten in 
this group of maritime neutrals that would defend its 
shipping rights against Britain. He wanted to insure that 
the principle of "free ships free goods" remained intact in 
the new treaty, and he was willing to negotiate other aspects 
of the dilemma, such as offering to conclude a new treaty, to 
insure that America defended its neutral rights against 
Britain. 35
There was some disagreement among the American 
commissioners on France's new proposals. Murray was willing 
to give up compensation in order to rid the United States of 
the old treaties. Ellsworth and Davie wanted France to pay 
compensation. The commission decided to proceed under thr 
latter idea, and accepted the French suggestion to reinstate 
the old treaties, which kept the compensation issue alive,^ 
The Americans then set about attempting to rid themselves of 
the troublesome sections of the old treaties
The Americans suggested that either nation be given 
seven years to buy itself out of certain conditions of the 
old treaties. For example, either nation could free itself 
from Article IX, the mutual guarantee provision, by paying 
five million francs within seven years. Likewise, either 
nation could pay the other three million francs to reduce
rights concerning/.privateers '/and; prises to most-favored 
nit ion status * The Americans''-also tried to remove Article 
XVII of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which stated that 
inhabitants of either nation could not do harm tc the persons 
or property of the other nation. They proposed that the 
other articles of this treaty should be modified to conform 
with most-favored nation status ,
The French did not accept this proposal, claiming that 
because the Americans were trying to remove Article XVII, 
that they were offering essentially a new treaty and 
therefore indemnities would not be due to American eitisens. 
The amounts that the Americans proposed to pay to rid 
themselves of the alliance clauses were less than the amount 
that the French would have to pay for its seizures. It would 
not have been favorable to the French to pay the seizure 
claims,^  The French envoys then proposed that the old 
treaties would remain in force, and commissions established 
to judge claims, They then added a proviso to Article XVII 
which stated that no refuge could be given to a ship which 
held the property or persons of either nation. If the United 
States could not comply with this addendum to Article XVII 
Hithin seven years, then the French would not have to pay 
American claims, In essence, the French were forcing the 
Americans to disallow the article in the Jay Treaty which 
allowed British ships to bring French prises into American
ports* This was unacceptable to the Americans, as that 
conflicted directly with their instructions, in that they 
could not compromise treaties with other nations/' This 
proposal was rejected, and the French ministers then proposed 
on September 4 to relinquish French rights under the old 
treaties# so long as the United States paid the claims of its 
citirens/0 This was just as unacceptable and the 
negotiations once again deadlocked. The French were simply 
not going to pay for illegal sei sures and grant the United 
States a new treaty at the same time.
The American commissioners decided at this point that 
some agreement was better than no agreement. This became 
especially important to the Americans as the war in Europe 
was showing signs of abating. They could not be in a state 
of hostilities against Bonaparte alone. Likewise* Bonaparte 
wanted to bring the United States into the neutral fold 
against the aggressions of Great Britain. Under these 
conditions, a temporary agreement was reached.
The Americans suggested on September 13 that the two 
countries should make a temporary agreement which would end 
hostilities# leaving the more divisive issues for later. The 
commissioners quickly came to agreement# with the French 
offering the principle of "free ships# free goods" to 
strengthen Bonaparte9* neutral rights policy against Britain, 
The convention was signed early in the morning on October 1,
although the date on the convention itself was September 30, 
There had been some disagreement over -the'"name of the 
convention, Bonaparte wanted to make it a treaty, which 
would add to his reputation as the defender' of neutral rights 
in .the eyes of the nmritime powers. The Americans simply 
wanted to call it a convention. After some bickering, they 
decided on "provisional treaty." Later, Bonaparte suggested 
convention, as that sounded' better than "provisional 
treaty."** The Quasi-War was finally over.
Peace, American Reaction, and the Election of 1800
v:o.v/v:v.:;f|ie French government took immediate steps to insure 
that nothing would ruin the peac^, Talleyrand ordered French 
agents m  the United States, to begin to normalise commercial 
relations, and Pichon was sent to the United States to 
replace the ailing Letombe as charge and to continue the 
process of normalisation. Not only was Pichon ordered to 
reestablish commercial relations, but he was also to make 
sure that depredations in the West Indies stopped, as France 
agreed to pay for any depredations that took place between 
the signing and the ratification of the convention—
The convention had difficulties in the United States. 
High Federalists considered the convention a disgrace to 
national honor. Jefferson, although he did support
Hami1 ton,features" and that it would not be popular.^  
likewise supported ratification. He thought that the 
convention ending hostilities was better than what a 
Republican president might do later on.^
Despite the lukewarm support of some High Federalist 
leaders such as Hamilton for the convention, High Federalists 
in the Senate nevertheless rejected it on January 23. They 
were especially concerned that Bonaparte wanted to use the 
principles in the convention against British maritime 
practices, and they were afraid that this might caused a 
problem in Anglo-American relations. Rufus King, however, in 
a meeting with Lord Grenville found the British were not 
insulted at all. Moderate Federalists praised the fact that 
the United States had finally gotten rid of the confining 
aspects of the 1778 treaties, and that this wan worth the 
sacrifice of the indemnities issue.
There was enough support from both Federalists and 
Republicans to approve the convention in the Senate, however. 
So Adams decided to resubmit it on February 3, and it passed. 
The biggest factor in many vote changes was that the 
convention was popular among traders and shippers who wanted 
commercial relations with France restored. There were 
changes made to it by the Senate. They eliminated the 
section of the treaty that did not set a time limit for the
negotiation of the outstanding issues and also limited the 
duration to eight years instead of it lasting forever. 
Although Adams did not like the adjustments/ he ratified'the 
convention shortly before he left office.*'
William Vans Hurray was once again called on to go to 
Paris, this time/ his duty was to conclude the negotiations 
and exchange ratifications. It was far from a simple 
exchange, -The'French government did like that the Senate had 
abolished the old treaties by eliminating the second article 
of the convention. Talleyrand stated that if the old 
treaties were done away with, there would be no indemnities. 
Once again, the two nations were negotiating from 
irreconcilable grounds. If someone did not compromise, the 
convention would not foe ratified and hostilities would 
continue. Murray decided once again to break his 
instructions. He accepted the French demand and gave up the 
Onited States' tight to the indemnities. Peace, however, was 
official; the ratifications were exchanged on July 31, 1801, 
almost six years to the day after the treaty that created the 
crisis was ratified.**
Peace was not the only effect of the negotiations, 
however. In the United States, there were far reaching 
effects. As the IIection of 1800 approached, the Moderate 
and High Federalist split had become more pronounced. The 
High Federalists believed that Adams had not been a good
party man throughout the crisis with France, and they 
endeavored to replace him with someone who was more 
accept able. Throughout 1800, High Federalists attacked 
Adams, and it did help to remove him from office. Federalist 
disunity had the effect of putting both the Republican 
candidates, Jefferson and Aaron Burr, ahead of both the 
Federalist candidates, thereby making a Republican victory 
certain.
The High Federalists originally hoped that they could 
convince George Washington to run, which would have uni t ied 
the party. With his death shortly after the departure of the 
peace commission, however, the High Federalists had to look 
elsewhere. This insured Federalist disunity, as Washington 
was the onlv figure who could unite all Federalists.
The High Federalists chose Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
as then unofficial candidate. As this fact became cleat to 
Adams in early 1800, Adams became more angry at Hamilton and 
his followers. This caused him to remove those members of 
his Cabinet that supported Hamilton, Pickering and McHenry. 
Although Wolcott was an ardent Hamiltonian, Adams retained 
him as Secretary of the Treasury. He forced McHenry's 
resignation on May 6 and outright fired Pickering on May 12, 
He basically accused both of them of being loyal only to 
Hamilton, not to his administration. He appointed Samuel 
Dexter to head the War Department and John Marshall to head
the State Department, both of whom were Moderate Federalists. 
This only added to the Federalist split.* T t must he noted 
that Adams, who was the Federal 1 st Party leader, did nothing 
during 1800 to heal the wounds of his own party. While his 
Cabinet and Hamilton disagreed with him on the chances tor 
peace, they were in fart executing hi s policies in their 
various capacities. The split became permanent only when 
Adams stopped going to his Cabinet for advice uni lat<-u 
dismissed Picketing and forced McHenry's resignation. Only- 
then did Hamilton and the High Federalists bee* n to camp* 1 gn 
actively against Adams. *:
The Republicans also contributed to their own victory. 
Realizing that political factions were a fact of life, they 
became an very organized group during th** campaign They 
were able to make g^od se of peace and their increasing 
popular support. Along with the Moderate Federalists in 
Congress, they were able to suspend the formation of the army 
in February, and they were able to stop new war measures that 
the High Federalists proposed. They also did well in the 
state elections of New York and Massachusetts, where Gerry 
came very close to winning the governorship. The Republicans 
in Hew York, under Aaron Burr, were able to carry the whole 
of Hew York City, which had traditionally been Federalist.
The Republican victory there gave them a majority in both 
houses of the Hew York legislature, which meant that all of
New York's electoral votes would go to the Republicans in the 
fall. This was an electoral victory for the Republicans, as 
New York had been Federalist in the Election of 1796. This 
forced the Federalists to find another source of votes to 
make up for the loss/ which they did not,
The effect of the Federalist split and Republican 
campaign tactics was a Republican victory. The two 
Republ i can candi 'hit es , Jef f «-i son and Eut i , t i ed f or f i i st 
place with seventy* three votes a piece, Auams f mished with 
sixty five, and Pinckney garnered sixtv-four.^ The election 
was then thrown to the House of Representatives, which was 
charged with the task of declaring a warmer. ironically, the 
Federalists had been gi ven a raeasut of control by the tie, 
as they could vote for whoever proms sed to be ♦ h** most 
"friendly/* Jefferson or Burr./ Many ■Federal is t s wanted to 
vote for Bur r . wh o was mo t e an t i - F i en c h t han Jeff e r s on .': bu t 
Hamilton, who absolutely hated Butt , placed his influence 
firmly behind Jefferson.^ The effect of this was almost, a 
deadlocked House. Many :Fedenlists voted for Bun. and the 
session went a full thirty six ballots until Jefferson was 
selected. The Delaware representative, dames A, Bayard, who 
had been/votingfor lurr, decided to change his vote to 
Jefferson because it seemed to him that the House was headed 
toward creating a national crisis if a deadlock persisted, 
Jefferson was elected on February 1?. 1801 which marked the
end of the Federalist Ira in American politics, 53
In the final analysis, the conclusion of the Quasi-War 
with France can he seen in similar terms as the conclusion of 
the Jay Treaty six years earlier. The United States had to 
accept what the greater power offered, or risk war. France 
was strong in 1800, and the war in Europe was coming to a 
close, The United States would have had no allies to help it 
defend itself if war came. So \t had to give up the 
■indemnities if it wanted to rid itself of the old treaties. 
This was the choice the commission had U j make, because the 
French offered nothing better. Murray saw the loss of the 
i n d eirrn i t i es ■ a s 1 ess impo r t a n t t h an t he a bo 1 i t i on o f t he old 
treaties, The British offered bettet terms to the Americans 
in 1794 than i h*=? French did in 1800 because at that time it 
was dependent on the Uni ted States for vital maritime 
operations among other things, France in 1800 did not need 
the United States as much as the British. Bonaparte was in a 
much better situation. He treated with the United States 
because a good showing would give legitimaey to his new 
government and impress the northern maritime powers. But if 
the United States demanded too much, then he would go to war. 
He could have afforded a war with the United States m  1800. 
where the British could not in 1794, In essence, it must be 
remembered that the United States was not t n j  eat Power 
that it is now or that it thought it was then. It could not
demand favorable terms from other powers, Men like Hamilton 
realized this, and were successful in their foreion policies. 
He recognized the limits of the United States, which accounts 
for his support of both the day Treaty and the Convention of 
1800. Men like Jefferson never did, which led the United 
Star i info problems later on.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION:
FEDERALIST FOREION POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE
The most important theme that ran through this period of 
American foreign relations was the ability of the United 
States government to take advantage of its diplomatic 
situation* Part and parcel of this idea was recognition by 
the Federalist administrations that America was 
diplomatically limited by its lesser power status* The 
Federalist governments of both Washington and Adams were able 
to recognise these limitations and work within them when they 
dealt with the European powers, especially Oreat Britain and 
France *
This recognition of realities was a part of the 
negotiation of Jay*s Treaty. Orest Eritain in IT94 was 
willing to make concessions to the United States* but it was 
not willing to negotiate all issues with the United States. 
The British government realised that it could not negot1 ate 
on issues such as impressment and neutral rights* These two 
policies were vital to the British war effort. John Jay did 
not press these issues, knowing that attempting to negotiate 
them would have been unsuccessful and could have harmed the 
chances of negotiating other issues successfully. He
110
therefore concent rater! on the recovery of American territory 
and trade issues. He was able to negotiate a timetable for 
the release of the forts and gain trade concessions* such as 
most-favored nation trade status and the opening '.-.of^ the last 
Indies to American ships. Although the net benefit of these 
concessions can be argued, there is no doubt that there was 
benefit for the United States, American trade/ and therefore 
government revenue, was greatly inci eased by . the-'treaty . It 
created the revenue that Hami 2 tort's treasury- needed to 
operate properly. Also, the treaty kept the United States 
but of a war that from a revenue standpoint it could not 
afford. The treaty of course, had its disadvantages for the 
United States, but it was probably as good a treaty as the 
United States could- have negotiated considering its 
d i ploma tie posit ion. The n egoi i a t ion was fa vorabie for the 
United S t a t es be c a us e 1 1 w a n able t o t a k e ad vantage of 
Britain's war problems. It did not want to risk a war in two 
hemispheres and drive the United States closer to the French, 
but it would if the United States demanded too much, which 
fortunately it did not.
The negotiation of the Convention of 1800 was similar. 
The United States was still the much weaker power as compared 
to France. In 1800 under Bonaparte, France was strong enough 
to defeat the United States in a war. But instead, it 
accepted the abrogation of its alliance with the United
States for a no-promise on the matter of seizures. The 
envoys were forced to break their instructions to arrive at 
this agreement, as they were ordered to both abrogate the old 
treaties arA gain a promise from the French for the payment 
of illegal seizures. They had little choice; the French 
seemed quite willing to allow the Quasi-War to continue, 
rather than to sacrifice both issuer.. It would have been an 
embarrassing peace for France if it had given in to the 
United States on both points.
There was outrage over the convention from High 
Federalists when it arrived in the United States, and no one, 
not even Republicans, could say that it was a '•good” treaty 
for the United States. But Alexander Hamilton, correctly 
understanding the international position of the country 
throughout the Federalist period, supported the convention 
and urged its ratification, realising that it would be 
impossible for the United States to gain both abrogation and 
payment. France wanted peace with the United States, but 
like any nation, it was not going to prostrate itself in 
front of a weaker nation to get it.
Throughout the explanations in this chapter about what 
each European power was willing to do and not wil1ing to do 
to make peace and why, there is the explicit' notion that the 
European powers had greater concerns than the United States 
whi 1 e negotiant ing wi t h i t; Sr i tain was concerned pr imar i 1 y
with the war in Europe in 1794, not the crisis in the 
Northwest. France was primarily concerned with stating its 
neutral rights doctrine, hoping that it could create an armed 
neutrality against Britain. The United States was able to 
take advantage :of the fact that Europe between .1789 and 1815 
was not pay i ng e1 os e a t  t en t ion to t he Unit ed S t a t es and the 
western hemisphere as it had done before.
Pinckney’s Treaty, which I have neglected in this work, 
was negotiated in large part because of the European 
situation. Before 1795, Spain was not interested in allowing 
Americans to navigate the Mississippi, nor did they want to 
give up the disputed territory in the Old Southwest, But when 
Spain to abandon the British and return to the Prer.ch
alliance, they knew that they would need a friendly United 
States that would not want to participate in a British 
invasion of Louisiana. Spain was very concerned about early 
reports on the lay Treaty, which indicated that the British 
and the Americans may have been forming an alliance. So the 
Spanish Court, fearing for its North American territories and 
wanting to drive a wedge in the possible Anglo-American 
ailimnce, decried to negotiate outstanding issues with the 
United States- The Americans were given the right of 
navigation, as well as a very favorable boundary in the Old 
Southwest, It did, however, limit the right of deposit in 
New Orleans to three years. The Spanish wanted to insure
that the treaty was not a complete embarrassment. When the 
Spanish government saw an official copy of Jay #s treaty and 
realised that there was no Anglo-American al.liance> it 
delayed ratification and implementation of the treaty for 
almost three years, as it did not want to put such an 
unfavorable treaty into effect. This is the best example 
throughout the per iod which T have st udied of t he Uni t ed 
States benefiting from the European situation. 4
Federalist diplomacy helped the United States immensely. 
Although the United States did not get .everything: it wanted 
from fhe iuropean powers, what it did get was very valuable. 
The treaty with Britain allowed the United States to become 
economi cal ly prosper ous and stable, Tteat ing with Fr ance 
ridded the United States of its confining alliance. The 
stability and prosperity that Fedoralist foreign policy 
created between 1791 and 1 B0 0 with these treaties were the 
tools that Jefferson would use to mold his more adventurous 
and risky foreign policy. It could be said that his policies 
led to greater successes; such as the-Louisiana Purchase, but 
they also led to great failures, like the crisis with Britain 
leading to the War of 1812. Regardless of what one thinks of 
Jefferson*s foreign policy, it all was made possible by the 
stability, prosperity and respect which Federalist foreign 
policy had created in the decade earlier for the United 
States.
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